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ABSTRACT 
 
Prompted by Hasok Chang’s conception of the history and philosophy of 
science (HPS) as the continuation of science by other means, I examine the 
possibility of obtaining scientific knowledge through philosophical criticism 
and reflection, in the light of four historical cases, concerning (i) the role of 
absolute space in Newtonian dynamics, (ii) the purported contraction of 
rods and retardation of clocks in Special Relativity, (iii) the reality of the 
electromagnetic ether, and (iv) the so-called problem of time’s arrow. In all 
four cases it is clear that a better understanding of such matters can be 
achieved —and has been achieved— through conceptual analysis. On the 
other hand, however, it would seem that this kind of advance has more to do 
with philosophical questions in science than with narrowly scientific 
questions. Hence, if HPS in effect continues the work of science by other 
means, it could well be doing it for other ends than those that working 
scientists ordinarily have in mind. 
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The mind will not readily give up the attempt to 
apprehend the exact formal character of the latent 
connexions between different physical agencies: and 
the history of discovery may be held perhaps to supply 
the strongest reason for estimating effort towards 
clearness of thought as of not less importance in its 
own sphere than exploration of phenomena. 
Joseph Larmor (1900), p. ix. 
 
Hasok Chang’s book Inventing Temperature (2004) offers in its last chapter a 
view of the history and philosophy of science (HPS) as “the continuation of science 
by other means”. The need for supplementing normal scientific research in this 
fashion was impressed on Chang by his personal experience as a philosophical 
historian of science, which he describes as “a curious combination of delight and 
frustration, of enthusiasm and skepticism, about science”. His delight in the beauty 
of conceptual systems and the masterfulness of experimental setups is mixed with 
“frustration and anger at the neglect and suppression of alternative conceptual 
schemes, at the interminable calculations in which the meanings of basic terms are 
never made clear, and at the necessity of accepting and trusting laboratory 
instruments whose mechanisms” he does not understand (p. 236). Chang claims 
that HPS can actually generate scientific knowledge in at least two ways. On the one 
hand, through the recovery of forgotten scientific knowledge, HPS can reopen 
neglected paths of inquiry. On the other hand, by applying the philosopher’s 
scalpel to the thick and often opaque tissue of scientific discourse, HPS can 
positively contribute to clarifying or eliminating the confused, ambiguous or 
downright inept notions that bedevil innovative scientific thinking and appear to 
blunt its cutting edge. 
Encouraged by Chang’s exposition, I propose to examine here the possibility of 
obtaining scientific knowledge through philosophical criticism and reflection, in the 
light of four historical cases. The examples I have chosen concern  
(i) the role of absolute space in Newtonian dynamics; 
(ii) the purported contraction of rods and retardation of clocks in Special 
Relativity (SR); 
(iii) the reality of the electromagnetic ether, and  
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(iv) the problem (or problems) that A.S. Eddington labeled with the catch 
phrase “the arrow of time”. 
The first and the third question are closed. Question (i) is clearly a matter of 
conceptual criticism and I take it up chiefly to show how this worked in a case 
about which there is now general agreement. The advent of Relativity a century 
ago settled question (iii) not through conceptual criticism but rather by Einstein’s 
fiat. However, by showing that the assumption of an ether was not necessary for 
solving the scientific problems that were deemed to require it, Einstein signaled the 
presence of a conceptual confusion or mistake at the root of that assumption. Could 
such a misconception have been overcome earlier by professional philosophers? My 
answer will be: Yes in principle, but hardly so in practice, for the ether hypothesis 
was favored by powerful cultural forces. 
When I began writing this paper I believed question (ii) was also closed, and I 
chose to deal with it as a positive illustration of the utility of HPS. When I first saw 
Harvey Brown’s new book (2005) I got the impression that he professed to have a 
different view of this question. The current significance of the issue itself was 
pleasantly enhanced in my eyes by this apparent discrepancy. However, after 
reading Brown’s book I made no changes in § 2 because, although I agree with 
almost all the many points he makes in it, I could not see that talk of ‘length 
contraction’ and ‘time dilation’ makes them more perspicuous.1 
Question (iv) is still the subject of impassioned arguments and few would 
pronounce it closed. However, in the last few years, judicious HPS work by Sklar, 
Uffink, Earman and others has greatly clarified its terms and exhibited the true 
reach of the concepts and propositions at play. This allows one to hope that the 
conundrum will, at long last, be solved, or dissolved. It is not easy to clear a field 
charged with so many emotions and weltanschauliche commitments, but a few 
                                            
1  Let me give just one example. Brown (2005), p. 25, says that, rather than conceiving 
relativistic spacetime geometry as a description of “the shape” of some thing-in-itself, 
“it is simply more natural and economical —better philosophy, in short— to consider 
absolute space-time structure as a codification of certain key aspects of the behaviour 
of particles (and/or fields).” I fully agree. However, once this codification is adopted, it 
is not longer fitting to say, e.g., that the negative result of Michelson and Morley’s 
experiment is due to the length contraction suffered by one of the arms of their 
interferometer. The status of this idiom in the special theory of relativity is similar to 
that of ‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’ in Newtonian celestial mechanics. 
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philosophical considerations might perhaps help to disentangle one or two threads 
of the knot.  
 
 
1. Absolute space in Newtonian dynamics 
 
In the Scholium to the Definitions placed at the head of his Principia, Newton 
explains: 
 
Absolute space, of its own nature without reference to anything external, 
always remains homogeneous and immovable. Relative space is any movable 
measure or dimension of this absolute space; such a measure or dimension is 
determined by our senses from the situation of the space with respect to 
bodies and is popularly used for immovable space, as in the case of space 
under the earth or in the air or in the heavens, where the dimension is 
determined from the situation of the space with respect to the earth. 
Absolute and relative space are the same in species and in magnitude, but 
they do not always remain the same numerically. For example, if the earth 
moves, the space of our air, which in a relative sense and with respect to the 
earth always remains the same, will now be one part of the absolute space 
into which the air passes, now another part of it, and thus will be changing 
continually in an absolute sense. 
(Newton 1687, p. 5; 1999, pp. 408s.) 
 
Further on, he adds: “Absolute motion is the change of position of a body from one 
absolute place to another; relative motion is change of position from one relative 
place to another” (Newton 1687, p. 6; 1999, pp. 409). However, since such 
absolute places cannot be perceived and distinguished by our senses, “we define all 
places on the basis of the positions and distances of things from some body that we 
regard as immovable, and then we reckon all motion with respect to these places, 
insofar as we conceive of bodies as being changed in position with respect to them” 
(Newton 1687, p. 7; 1999, pp. 410s.). According to Newton, to use relative places 
and motions instead of absolute ones is all right when conducting ordinary human 
business (in rebus humanis), but would be inappropriate in science (in philosophicis). 
However, absolute and relative motions can be recognized by their respective 
causes and effects. 
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The causes that distinguish true motions from relative motions are the forces 
impressed upon bodies to generate motion. True motion is neither generated 
nor changed except by forces impressed upon the moving body itself, but 
relative motion can be generated and changed without the impression of 
forces upon this body. […] The effects distinguishing absolute motion from 
relative motion are the forces of receding from the axis of circular motion. For 
in purely relative circular motion these forces are null, while in true and 
absolute circular motion they are larger or smaller in proportion to the 
quantity of motion.  
(Newton 1687, p. 9; 1999, p. 412) 
 
This passage is followed by the description of the famous bucket experiment, which 
I presume is known to the reader. 
Despite Newton’s somewhat peremptory assertions, the causes and effects he 
mentions and the ingenious experiment he designed to exhibit them cannot 
distinguish true motion, as defined by him, from motion relative to a rigid body that 
travels with unchanging speed and direction, without rotation, in absolute space. 
This follows at once from Corollary 5 to Newton’s Laws of Motion: 
 
When bodies are enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation to one another 
are the same whether the space is at rest or whether it is moving uniformly 
straight forward without circular motion. 
 (Newton 1687, p. 9; 1999, p. 423) 
 
In particular, Newton’s bucket will behave in exactly the same way whether its axis 
of rotation is at rest in absolute space or in a laboratory that moves “uniformly 
straight forward without circular motion”. The upshot of this is that the notions of 
absolute space and absolute motion play absolutely no role in Newtonian dynamics. 
Therefore, the philosophical discussions provoked by the presence of these notions 
in the Principia —which began already in Newton’s lifetime in the celebrated 
correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke— were wide off the mark and quite 
unnecessary. Newtonian dynamics makes an essential distinction between bodies 
acted upon by a force and bodies on which no net external force is acting. 
However, the latter class of bodies —and the reference frames based on them (the 
so-called inertial frames)— may move past each other with constant relative 
velocities of every conceivable magnitude and direction. Newton’s theory makes no 
allowance for any empirical or rational way of telling which of them is truly at rest. 
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Therefore, for these bodies —and frames— the distinction between true and 
absolute rest and motion is vacuous.  
As I have shown, a careful reading of the first few pages of Newton’s book 
should have been sufficient to see this. It is merely a matter of understanding the 
concepts at play and the logical relations among them. Nevertheless, it does not 
appear that any physicists or philosophers became aware of the perfect idleness of 
Newton’s absolute space before the advent and dissemination of Einstein’s theory of 
relativity in the 20th century. Mach and other 19th century critics of Newton 
argued that physics can do without postulating an absolute space, but it does not 
seem to me that they ever dared to suggest that this postulate does not perform any 
job in Newton’s theory. Such a lasting state of intellectual blindness was probably 
due above all to the resilience of the aboriginal —one is inclined to say instinctive— 
human ideas of motion and rest, which long stood in the way of the acceptance of 
Copernicanism and which Newton, with his talk about true motions, somehow 
sought to restore in a Copernican setting. It was —and still is— hard for humans to 
accept that the ground under their feet is in motion, unless they are accorded an 
ultimate standard of rest to which such motion can be referred. I suspect, however, 
that an explicit dismissal of absolute space by 18th and 19th century Newtonians 
was also prevented by their lack of an alternative mathematical structure to put in 
its place. 
Let me try to explain what I mean. Newton said that space was neither a 
substance nor an attribute of substances, but had its own peculiar manner of being.2 
By virtue of it, “the parts of space are individuated by their positions, so that if any 
two could exchange their positions, they would also exchange their identities, and 
would be converted into each other qua individuals”. Hence, “it is only through 
their reciprocal order and positions [propter solum ordinem et positiones inter se] that 
the parts of […] space are understood to be the very ones that they truly are; and 
they do not have any other principle of individuation besides this order and posi-
tion” (Hall and Hall 1962, p. 103). In these words, Newton characterized not only 
the peculiar mode of being of space, but also an unprecedented ontological 
category, that takes pride of place in modern theoretical physics: the self-subsisting 
                                            
2  Newton, De gravitatione, in Hall and Hall (1962), p. 99. 
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relational system, commonly known as a mathematical structure.3 The structure that 
Newton identifies here with physical space is of course the so-called Euclidean 
space,4 homeomorphic with ℝ3. Now, each relative space determined by a rigid 
body (as described in my quotation from Newton 1687, p. 5) is an instance of this 
structure, but Newton would not countenance the real existence of more than one. 
However, as I have noted, he had no theoretical or experimental means of pin-
pointing the one absolute space among —or besides— the multiplicity of relative 
ones. But now, in the wake of Minkowski and Cartan, we can seize the whole 
thicket of relative spaces without sacrificing our yearning for oneness. More 
precisely, we can retain the whole uncountable set of Euclidean spaces determined 
by the inertial frames, conceive a single mathematical structure embracing them all, 
and identify this one structure with the physical habitat of bodies.  
There are several ways of doing this, but for illustration one will be enough.5 Let 
W be a parallelizable differentiable manifold, homeomorphic with ℝ4, and 
endowed with a flat torsionless linear connection ?. Define a foliation ƒ indexed by 
Newtonian absolute time t, which partitions W into flat hypersurfaces 
homeomorphic with ℝ3. Define a Euclidean metric  on hypersurface ƒ(0). Call a 
curve in W timelike if it meets each leaf of the foliation once and once only. 
Consider the set G of all the timelike geodesics of W, parametrized by Newtonian 
time t. Let  and  belong to G. If  and  are parallel, we write  || . Clearly, the 
                                            
3  The Bourbaki group defined ‘species of structure’ precisely, in set-theoretical terms. I 
would propose that philosophers use the term more loosely, to make allowance for 
progress in mathematics, such as is being made by category theorists. Still I see 
nothing wrong in using Bourbaki’s definition as a guide to understanding, provided 
that one bears in mind —and discounts— the stiltedness of the set-theoretic 
approach.  
4  It would be more proper to say Cartesian space, rather than Euclidean space. Why? 
Because Euclid’s space only includes points that can be constructed with ruler and 
compass, and therefore lacks the continuity properties required for analysis. 
5  The mathematical terminology used in this paragraph is standard and is explained in 
many textbooks of differential geometry or general relativity; also, cursorily, in the 
Mathematical Appendix to Torretti (1983). However, for the philosophical purposes of 
this paper the readers need not understand it. It is sufficient that they accept on faith 
my claim that a sophisticated mathematical conception can do the job for which 
Newton’s absolute space was designed but turned out to be inappropriate. 
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relation || is an equivalence (i.e. a symmetric, reflexive and transitive binary 
relation) on G. Each element F of the quotient set G/|| is a congruence of timelike 
geodesics (i.e. a set of timelike geodesics in W such that every point of W lies on one 
and only one geodesic of the set). The metric  on ƒ(0) can be readily induced on 
each F  G/|| by postulating that the distance between any two geodesics  and  
of F equals the -distance between the two points at which  and  meet ƒ(0). 
Thus enriched, each F  G/|| can stand for the relative space associated with an 
inertial frame in Newton’s world. The structure W,?,ƒ,,G/|| can then take in 
Newton’s theory the foundational role that Newton assigned to absolute space, but 
which, by dint of his Laws of Motion, the latter could not play. 
Two questions come to one’s mind in connection with Chang’s program:  
(1) Is it at all likely that, before the development of these mathematical 
concepts in the 20th century, a solution of this sort could have been found in an 
HPS department, if such departments had been already founded —and funded— 
before 1900? I have a hunch that it is not, and that it was due to the lack of 
mathematical resources that a man like Ludwig Lange, who thoroughly understood 
the relativity of motion and the inanity of Newton’s absolute space, did not seek an 
alternative geometrical structure to stand in its stead, but proposed his pseudo-
operationalistic construction of a prototype inertial frame.6  
(2) Did the delay in substituting a more suitable structure for Newton’s absolute 
space hinder the progress of classical physics in any way? Again, I am tempted to 
say no. Philosophers and philosophically minded physicists repeatedly referred to 
absolute space as a bugaboo —”ein Unding”, said Kant— and probably regarded it 
as a scientific scandal; but I do not see that any astronomical discovery or any 
application of mechanics to engineering was postponed because physicists paid lip 
service to Newton’s phantasy. Perhaps the labors lost in figuring out the physics of 
ether could have been spared if the relativism inherent in Newtonian dynamics had 
sooner become explicit. (However, the demand for a material carrier of light waves 
was surely rooted on a cruder and sturdier metaphysical craving than Newton’s 
promotion of a single pure relational system to be the playground of nature.) One 
may also suggest that conceptual criticism of absolute time (Einstein 1905, §1) 
would have been prompted at an earlier date if the useless idea of absolute space 
                                            
6  See Ludwig Lange (1885), James Thomson (1884). I explained this matter in Torretti 
(1983), pp. 17ff. See also DiSalle (1988). 
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had been dropped sooner. In Newtonian physics absolute time is certainly not an 
idle notion and local clocks can be regulated by it (e.g. due to the conservation of 
angular momentum, a rotating rigid top, isolated from external influences, will 
accurately keep such time). The difficulty lies in the global propagation of local 
time (the effective definition of the foliation ƒ in the mathematical construction 
sketched above). According to Newton, “we understand any moment of duration to 
be diffused throughout all spaces, after its own way [unumquodque durationis 
momentum…per universa spatia, suo more…diffundi intelligimus]” (Hall and Hall 
1962, p. 104). However, if the reference to universa spatia turns out to be 
equivocal, for there is more than just one universal space to which they may belong, 
then Newton’s claim is not merely unwarranted —as James Thomson (1884, p. 
569) perceived— but it is actually vacuous, and one may well expect that a 
suitable propagation of local time throughout space will yield a different global time 
depending on the inertial frame to which the space is anchored. 
 
 
2. Rod contraction and clock retardation in Special Relativity. 
 
In Newtonian mechanics, global time coordinate functions must agree up to a 
translation (choice of the zero of time) and a rescaling (choice of the time unit). As 
a result of this, the world can be partitioned into equivalence classes of simultaneous 
events in one way only. This property is represented by the uniqueness of the 
foliation ƒ: ℝ Æ W in the mathematical construction of §1. Einstein assumed that 
such uniqueness need not hold, so that the same events can be differently 
distributed among simultaneity classes, depending on the inertial frame with which 
the relevant time coordinate function is associated. By this bold and decisive move 
he was able to embrace together two physical principles that were incompatible 
under the Newtonian dispensation, viz., the Principle of Relativity, by which no 
physical experiment can tell apart a particular inertial frame as a true standard of 
rest, and the Principle of the Constancy of the Velocity of Light, by which light 
propagates in vacuum with the same constant speed relative to all inertial frames, 
regardless of the velocity of its source. The joint assertion of these two principles 
entails a drastic change in the basic rules for describing physical phenomena. For 
simplicity’s sake I assume that durations are measured in seconds (s) —as usual— 
and lengths in light-seconds (Ls), where 1 Ls is the distance traveled in 1 s by a 
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light signal in vacuo (in these units, the speed of light c = 1 Ls/s).7 Let F and F? be 
two inertial frames moving past each other with speed v Ls/s. Let x, y, z and x?, y?, z? 
be Cartesian coordinates defined on the spaces associated with F and F?, 
respectively, and let time coordinates t and t? be defined, respectively, in the 
primed and in the unprimed frame by the method explained by Einstein (1905, 
§1). Without loss of generality we can assume that (i) both the primed and the 
unprimed systems assign coordinates (0,0,0,0) to the same event; (ii) at time t = t? = 
0, the homonymous axes of both systems are aligned with each other and 
coordinate values increase along them in the same sense; and (iii) the constant 
velocity of frame F? relative to F has components (v,0,0). Einstein showed that, 
under these assumptions, his two principles imply that the coordinate systems 
(x,y,z,t) and (x?,y?,z?,t?) are linked by the following equations:8 
 
 
?x = x ? vt
1? v2
?y = y
?z = z
?t = t ? vx
1? v2
 (1) 
  
Suppose that the two endpoints of a measuring rod ?? at rest in F? have spatial 
coordinates ?x1, ?y1, ?z1( )  and ?x2 , ?y1, ?z1( ) . The spatial coordinates of ?? in F at time t = t? 
= 0 are then: 
 
  
x1 = ?x1 1? v2
y1 = ?y1
z1 = ?z1
 
x2 = ?x2 1? v2
y2 = ?y2
z2 = ?z2
 (2) 
 
Suppose that ?? is a standard meter rod. Then, obviously, the distance ?x1 ? ?x2  
between its endpoints equals 1 m = 299,792,458 Ls in the frame F? on which it 
                                            
7  By an international agreement in force since 1983, 1 meter equals 299,792,458 light-
seconds, exactly. 
8  This is the simplest case of a Lorentz transformation between coordinate systems 
adapted to inertial frames that move relatively to each another. They are thus called 
because H.A. Lorentz (1899, 1904) introduced this coordinate transformation in a 
context akin to Einstein’s (though with a conceptually altogether different outlook). 
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rests. Hence, by the transformation equations (1), the distance between the 
endpoints of ?? in the frame F relative to which it is moving with longitudinal speed 
v is given by 
 
 x1 ? x2 = ?x1 ? ?x2 1? v2  (3) 
 
and is therefore shorter than one meter by a factor of 1? v2 .  
This phenomenon was described as relativistic rod contraction in the scientific 
literature of the 1900’s because it was readily confused with the physical 
contraction of rigid rods by exactly the same factor postulated (independently) 
about 1890 by G.F. FitzGerald and H.A. Lorentz to explain the negative result of 
Michelson and Morley’s attempt to measure the velocity of the Earth in the ether. 
Lorentz and FitzGerald regarded the contraction named after them as a real 
change in the rod. They believed that the forces that keep the smallest parts of solid 
bodies in place are electromagnetic in nature, and expected those forces to be 
altered by a body’s motion through the electromagnetic ether, then supposed to be 
the seat of the electric and the magnetic fields (see §3). The Lorentz-FitzGerald 
contraction was designed to ensure that one of the two perpendicular steel bars 
along which light travels in Michelson’s interferometer is shortened by the precise 
amount required to conceal the motion of the Earth in the ether.9 However, under 
Einstein’s two principles, light travels on any inertial frame with the same speed in 
every direction, and Michelson and Morley’s optical experiment —though accurate 
up to terms of the second order in v/c— cannot disclose the (almost) inertial motion 
of the Earth parallel to one of the interferometer’s arms.  
Relative motion will not make a solid body shorter in the way that, say, heat 
makes it larger. Indeed, if the motion of inertial frame F? relative to inertial frame F 
effectively shortens the standard meter rod ?? that rests in F? relatively to a meter 
rod ? at rest in F, then we must also conclude that the motion of F relatively to F? 
also shortens ? relatively to ?? in exactly the same proportion. Some people relish 
such brainteasing descriptions, but others, more sensibly, perceive them as a misuse 
of language. Anyhow, a short reflection on the meaning of the terms that occur in 
                                            
9  Michelson (1881), Michelson and Morley (1887). The experiment is described in 
many places, usually from a relativistic standpoint. To see what Michelson was 
actually up to I recommend reading his paper of 1881 (reproduced in Kilmister 1970, 
pp. 91-104). 
Philosophical criticism and the advancement of science 12 
eqn. (3) shows that in the present case there is no need for them. ?x1 ? ?x2  denotes 
the distance between the endpoints of the meter rod ?? at rest in F?. x1 ? x2  
denotes the distance between two points of F each one of which coincides with an 
endpoint of ??. Now, as ?? moves along the x-axis of F, its endpoints coincide 
successively with indenumerably many different points of F, so, to know what we 
are speaking about we must impose one further condition on the two points in 
question. It goes without saying that the two points of F whose distance is denoted 
by x1 ? x2  must coincide simultaneously with the two endpoints of ??. Choose any 
two points of F that meet this condition. I designate by E1 and E2 the two events at 
which the chosen points coincide with the respective endpoint of ??. Simultaneity 
in F agrees with the time coordinate t defined on F by Einstein’s method. Under the 
conditions prescribed for our example, t(E1) = t(E2) implies that t?(E1) ? t?(E2), so 
that E1 and E2 are not simultaneous on F?. Therefore, it is no wonder that 
 
 ?x1 ? ?x2 ≠ x1 ? x2  (4) 
 
for —contrary to what one still reads in semipopular literature— each side of this 
inequality refers to a different physical quantity.10 While the l.h.s. denotes the 
length of rod ??, that is, the distance between the two points on its rest frame F? with 
which the endpoints of ?? invariably coincide, the r.h.s. denotes the distance 
between two points on the frame F which happen to coincide, respectively, with 
the two endpoints of ??, at some instant of time t (defined by Einstein’s method on 
                                            
10  Already in his first paper on relativity, Einstein explained this with unsurpassable 
clarity. When one asks about the length of a moving rod one can think it as being 
ascertained by one or the other of the two following operations: “(a) The observer 
moves together with the given measuring-rod and the rod to be measured, and 
measures the length of the rod directly by superposing the measuring-rod, in just the 
same way as if all three were at rest. (b) By means of clocks at rest set up in the 
stationary system and synchronized in accordance with §1 [i.e. by Einstein’s method 
of synchronizing clocks with light-signals], the observer ascertains at what points of 
the stationary system the two ends of the rod to be measured are located at a definite 
time. The distance between these two points, measured by the measuring-rod already 
employed, which in this case is at rest, is also a length which may be named as ’the 
length of the rod’.” (1905, §2, pp. 895-896; Kilmister’s translation, slightly 
retouched). One surmises that the writers who created the confusion on this subject 
never read thus far into Einstein’s paper. 
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F), as ?? moves along with constant velocity components (v,0,0). Since we assumed 
that ?? is a meter rod, ?x1 ? ?x2  equals the distance a light signal travels on F? in 
299,792,458 seconds. Therefore, by eqn. (3), the distance x1 ? x2  between two 
simultaneous positions of the endpoints of ?? on F is shorter by a factor of 1? v2  
than the distance a light signal travels in 299,792,458 seconds on F (which, by 
Einstein’s two principles, also equals one meter). When the meaning of eqn. (3) is 
elucidated in this way, it appears like a rather unsurprising consequence of the 
relativity of simultaneity, which is neither paradoxical, nor incomprehensible, nor 
the effect of a physical force. The equation does not describe the contraction of a 
rod, but rather conveys the proportionality between (a) the distance that separates 
two points located in the space of a particular inertial frame, and (b) the distance 
that separates another two points located in the space of a different frame. 
The Lorentz transformation eqns. (1) also entail the phenomenon known as 
special relativistic clock retardation. Again, this term has caused much puzzling and 
should be regarded as a misnomer; though it is a rather natural one, for how else 
would an air traffic controller, say, be supposed to describe the state of the atomic 
clocks that Hafele and Keating (1972) carried around the world on jetliners, when 
she compared them with the similar clocks that staid back at the airport?11 The 
airport clocks were good atomic clocks, synchronized with the best in the world; the 
flying clocks had been carefully synchronized with them on departure, but were no 
longer synchronized with them on arrival: the arriving clocks showed a —very 
slightly— earlier time; in other words, they ran slower. Is not this precisely what we 
call clock retardation in English? Readers of this journal will at once remark that this 
ordinary manner of speaking presupposes a unique standard of universal time-
reckoning, and that SR did away with that (or rather, showed that it had never 
                                            
11  Hafele and Keating’s experiment was meant to test a prediction of General Relativity 
(GR), by taking atomic clocks to an altitude where the gravitational potential is 
significantly different from that on the surface of the Earth. However, in their 
calculations they also had to make allowance for the speed of the jet plane on which 
the clocks traveled. To separate the phenomenon predicted by SR from the 
gravitational GR effect, some of the clocks were flown around the world from West to 
East, the others from East to West. Upon their arrival, comparison of the two sets of 
traveling clocks among themselves and with those that remained on Earth nicely 
confirmed the combined predictions of both theories. 
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been in place). Still, to keep balance with the preceding discussion of rod 
contraction, I shall once more go through the derivation and elucidation of the 
relativistic phenomenon.12 
Consider a standard clock ??
0
 affixed to point (0,0,0) of our frame F?, which 
shows time t? = 0 as it passes by point (0,0,0) of F. By our earlier assumptions, the 
clock ?0 affixed to this point of F should, at that instant, show time t = 0, and thus 
be synchronized with the clock ??
0
. After u seconds, ??
0
 will show time t? = u and 
will be passing by the point (vt,0,0) of F. Denote this event by E. Eqns. (1) enable 
us to calculate the time t(E), shown by the clock ?vt affixed to this point, as ??0  
passes by it. We have that 
 
 
 u = ?t (E) = t(E)? vx(E)
1? v2
=
t(E)? v2t(E)
1? v2
=
t(E)(1? v2 )
1? v2
 (5) 
 
Hence, 
 
 t(E) =
u
1? v2
> u  (6) 
 
Thus, the clock ?vt shows a later time than ??0  and, if judged by it, ??0  must be said 
to be running slow. However, the observers at rest on F?, who take ??
0
 as their 
standard of time, cannot infer from eqn. (5) that ?vt is running fast, for ??0  has not 
been synchronized with ?vt, but only with the clock ?0 affixed to point (0,0,0) of F. 
At time t? = u, ?0 travels with velocity (–v,0,0) past the point (–vu,0,0) of F?. 
Denote this event by E* and let ??
– vu
 be a clock affixed to this point and 
synchronized by Einstein’s method with ??
0
. As E* occurs, 
 
??
– vu
 displays time 
t?(E*) = u. The time t(E*) displayed by ?0 can be readily figured out from eqns. (1) 
after exchanging primed and unprimed coordinates and substituting –v for v. We 
have then that x(E*) = ( ?x (E*) + vu) (1? v2 )?1/2  = 0 (as expected, for it was assumed 
that E* takes place at point (–vu,0,0) of F?), and that 
 
 t(E*) =
?t (E*)+ v ?x (E*)
1? v2
=
u ? v2u
1? v2
=
u(1? v2 )
1? v2
= u 1? v2 < u  (7) 
                                            
12  I have already done so in Torretti 1983, pp. 68-69, and again more succintly in 
Torretti 1999b, pp. 73-75. 
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Therefore, judged by 
 
??
– vu
—and by ??
0
, which runs in unison with it on F?—, it is ?0 
that runs slow. The same evidently holds for all clocks at rest on F and synchronized 
with ?0 by Einstein’s method, including of course ?vt. Talk of “clock retardation” 
makes this sound paradoxical, for indeed, how can the same two clocks, viz., ??
0
 and 
?vt,, at the same time run slower and faster than each other? There is no doubt that 
they cannot, but there is no question here of this happening at the same time: ??
0
 
runs slower that the clocks on frame F when judged according to time t defined on 
F by Einstein’s method, and ?0 runs slower than the clocks on frame F? when 
judged according to time t? defined by Einstein’s method on F?. Note, in particular, 
that the event E*, which is, by hypothesis, simultaneous with E on F?, cannot be 
simultaneous with E on F. Therefore, the following inequalities, jointly implied by 
(6) and (7), should not come as a surprise: 
 
  t(E*) < t?(E*) = u = t?(E) < t(E) (8) 
 
The debate set off by (8) takes a picturesque turn if we consider the case of two 
twins, one of which rests on inertial frame F while the other one travels at a very 
high speed v, to and from a nearby star. If the latter twin travels practically all that 
time at constant speed v = 0.9 Ls/s while the former goes through 80 birthdays, 
then the traveling twin will enjoy less than 35 birthdays during the trip. If, as we 
may assume for simplicity’s sake, they both remain in good health, their biological 
clocks will have been running approximately like atomic clocks and the difference 
in age will be manifest. Several confused and confusing arguments were prompted 
by this example. Some pointed out that, due to the relativity of motion, the twins 
were exchangeable, so that the latter aged to 80 while the former became 35. For 
them, this example furnished the ultimate reductio ad absurdum of Relativity.13 
Clearly, they disregarded the obvious asymmetry of the situation, in which one twin 
rests permanently on a single inertial frame, while the other must rest on two (at 
least), one in the outward voyage, another one while returning. Others claimed 
that, because changing frames requires accelerated motion, the example fell outside 
the scope of SR. This is, of course, quite false, for accelerated motion is difficult to 
handle but by no means intractable in this theory. Indeed, one ought to wonder 
                                            
13  The British scientist Sir Herbert Dingle was probably the most tenacious upholder of 
this standpoint; the story of his long fight for it is told with considerable sympathy by 
Hasok Chang (1993). 
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what could be the use of a physical theory in which there is no room for accelerated 
motion! Anyway, after Hafele and Keating successfully carried out a realistic 
version of the twin experiment (see footnote 11), one can in good conscience deal 
with it ideally and assume that the traveling twin, upon reaching the nearby star, 
jumps instantaneously from a frame that moves with velocity components (0.9,0,0) 
relative to a suitable Cartesian coordinate system adapted to F, to another frame 
that moves with velocity components (–0.9,0,0) relative to the same system.14 In 
this case, the traveling twin’s speed is equal to 0.9 all of the time. 
Summing up: Clarity of mind suffices to rid oneself of the spooks of rod 
contraction and clock retardation. However, clarity of mind often is in short supply 
among educated people. In the case in point it was achieved only through long 
debates and intense reflection. Undoubtedly a physicist can apply SR in his work 
and even design experiments for testing it while he remains attached to the 
wrongheaded reading of equations (3) and (5) that I have discussed above. Still, I 
see a significant difference between such a physicist and the Newtonians who paid 
obeisance to absolute space. Whereas the latter inserted this idle notion in their 
scientific discourse as a purely verbal ornament, which could neither add nor 
subtract anything from the way they actually dealt with physical problems, the 
former adopts and disseminates a misconception of real physical phenomena.15 
Although such misconceptions need not stop progress within the bounds of a 
particular research, overcoming them surely contributes to the overall advancement 
of science. Thus, the examples of conceptual criticism presented in this section, 
though modest, corroborate the utility of Chang’s program. 
 
                                            
14  For a calculation based on this assumption and using the foregoing data, see Torretti 
1999a, pp. 277-280. 
15  Prof. Miguel Espinoza (private communication) has prompted me to explain what I 
mean by a ‘real physical phenomenon’. Rather than try my own hand at it, I seize on 
this opportunity to quote C. S. Peirce: “When an experimentalist speaks of a 
phenomenon […] he does not mean any particular event that did happen to somebody 
in the dead past, but what surely will happen to everybody in the living future who 
shall fulfill certain conditions. The phenomenon consists in the fact that when an 
experimentalist shall come to act according to a certain scheme that he has in mind, 
then will something else happen, and shatter the doubts of sceptics, like the celestial 
fire upon the altar of Elijah” (1931-1958, vol. 5, §425). 
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3. The ether hypothesis in pre-relativistic electrodynamics.16 
 
 
 
Die Einführung des Namens ‘Äther’ in die elektrischen 
Theorien hat zur Vorstellung eines Mediums geführt, 
von dessen Bewegung man sprechen könne, ohne daß 
man wie ich glaube, mit dieser Aussage einen 
physikalischen Sinn verbinden kann. 
Einstein to Mariç, August 1899.17 
 
In the introduction to the famous paper, “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter 
Körper”, in which Einstein laid down the foundations of SR, he wrote: “The 
introduction of a ‘light-ether’ will prove to be superfluous”.18 This statement reminds 
me of the little child’s cry “But he’s got nothing on!” in Andersen’s tale about the 
emperor new clothes. Just as the false tailors disappear from the tale as soon as the 
child has spoken, so ether, which for centuries had filled the universe (in the dreams 
of Reason), vanished like an exorcised ghost after that short remark by the junior 
patent official in Bern. Well, I admit there is some exaggeration in this statement of 
mine, for Relativity was stiffly resisted at first by numerous scientists and 
philosophers. Still, it does not appear that they thought Relativity was false because 
it denied the ether.19 By contrast, ca. 1905 a new physical theory that denied 
                                            
16  Nersessian (1984) is a book-length study of this subject, conducted from the 
philosophically significant standpoint of concept formation. 
17  “The introduction of the noun ‘ether’ in the theories of electricity has led to the idea 
of a medium, of whose motion one could speak, without, I believe, being able to attach 
a physical meaning to one’s utterance” (Einstein 1987- , 1: 226). I owe this striking 
quotation to John Stachel (2002), p. 171, whose English translation I reproduce with 
minor changes. 
18  “Die Einführung eines ‘Lichtäthers’ wird sich insofern als überflüssig erweisen, als 
nach der zu entwickelnden Auffassung weder ein mit besonderen Eigenschaften 
ausgestatteter ‘absolut ruhender Raum’ eingeführt, noch einem Punkte des leeren 
Raums, in welchem elektromagnetische Prozesse stattfinden, ein 
Geschwindigkeitsvektor zugeordnet wird” (Einstein 1905, p. 277). Kilmister translates 
‘Lichtäther’ as ‘luminiferous ether’. I have preferred the more literal translation of the 
same expression by D.E. Jones in his authorized translation of Hertz (1893), p. 24. 
19  At least I am not aware of anyone having raised this objection. H.A. Lorentz insisted 
to the end of his life that his own ether-based electrodynamics of moving bodies was, 
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radioactivity would have been laughed out of court. Surely, then, the existence of 
the light-ether was not supported by any hard facts. Indeed, it would seem that 
there was not much to be said for it, and that, therefore, a team of philosophers of 
science could have promptly got rid of it through conceptual criticism. This would 
have spared 19th-century science many fruitless efforts. 
However, even a superficial glance at the history of ideas makes it doubtful that 
mere philosophers could have succeeded in suppressing the ether. For, as G.N. 
Cantor (1981) showed, the existence of one or more ethers was regarded by many 
scientists as a material aid to their Christian or spiritualistic beliefs, and we know all-
too-well, after 350 years of Enlightenment, that ideas benefiting from this 
connection are dreadfully resilient and impervious to criticism. The religious 
associations of ether —or æther— are implicit in its name, a transcription of the 
Greek word a‡yhr, which to Homer meant ‘heaven’ (Iliad, 16.365), and which 
Aristotle adopted as the name of the fifth element, the changeless stuff that the 
heavens are made of. 
After Tycho, tracking the comet of 1572, showed that the planets are not 
affixed to impenetrable spheres, the word ‘ether’ became redundant and was ready 
to acquire a new meaning. The conception of ether as a fluid, transparent, 
extremely subtle form of matter that thoroughly fills the vast interstellar and 
interplanetary spaces is usually attributed to Descartes.20 In the Principles of 
Philosophy, Descartes consistently refers to this form of matter as ‘the second 
                                                                                                                                  
in its mature version of 1904, just as good as Einstein’s, with which it is empirically 
equivalent (both yield exactly the same predictions); but he never claimed that the 
latter was disqualified by its denial of ether. On the other hand, I learnt recently that 
J.J. Thomson said as late as 1909 that ether is as essential to us as the air we breathe, 
and that the study of this substance is the most important task of physics! (quoted in 
French translation by Samueli and Boudenot 2005, p. 107.) 
20 For instance, by Whittaker 1951/53, 1: 5: “Space is thus, in Descartes view, a plenum, 
being occupied by a medium which, though imperceptible to the senses, is capable of 
transmitting force, and exerting effects on material bodies immersed in it—the aether, 
as it is called”. A careful reader will notice that Whittaker does not say that Descartes 
himself used this word to call it.  
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element’ (1644, III, §§ 52, 70, 82, 123; 1996, 8: 105, 121, 137, 172).21 However, 
in the same year in which this book was published, Sir Kenelm Digby used ‘aether’ 
in English to designate the transparent interstellar matter (Oxford English Dictionary, 
s.v. ether, 5.a), and the term was later employed in this sense, as a matter of course, 
both in England and in the Continent.22 According to Descartes, this form of matter 
is immensely more abundant than the two other kinds acknowledged by him: the 
opaque matter of the Earth and the other planets, and the radiant matter of the 
Sun and the stars. 
The Cartesian ether, which lacked even the faintest trace of empirical evidence, 
was postulated on purely a priori grounds, namely, that the existence of an empty 
space is a contradiction in terms.23 It was held to be the vehicle of light, either as a 
rigid solid that transmits it instantly (according to Descartes 1637, pp. 3-6; 1996, 
6: 83-86), or as an elastic fluid through which light propagates with finite speed in 
the guise of longitudinal waves (according to Huygens, 1690). But the ether also 
played a central role in the explanations of planetary motion and free fall proposed 
by Descartes himself and other Cartesian physicists. These explanations rest on the 
assumption that any portion of ether in motion will act by impulse on other portions 
of it and on other kinds of matter. So the planets are carried around the Sun by 
ether whirlwinds, like logs driven by a river. On the other hand, terrestrial bodies are 
made heavy by the relative lightness of celestial matter, which, however, is not an 
irreducible quality, but a consequence of the greater speed with which this subtle 
kind of matter moves upward, through the pores of gross terrestrial bodies, leaving 
them behind: “This celestial matter has more force to move away from the centre 
                                            
21  In the early, posthumously published book Le monde, he called it ‘air’, but not without 
warning the reader that it must not be confused with “this gross air we breathe” 
(Descartes 1996, 10: 28). 
22  See Newton’s posthumous papers in Hall & Hall (1962), pp. 94, 112, 220. Also 
Huygens (1888-1950), 19: 472, 473, 573; 21: 454; cf. 19: 463; Leibniz (1965), 4: 
469. 
23  “If you wish to conceive that God takes away all the air in a room, without replacing it 
with another body, then by the same token you must conceive that the walls of this 
room come together, or else there will be a contradiction in your thought”—Descartes 
to Mersenne, 9 January 1639 (in Descartes 1996, 2: 482). 
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around which it turns than any of the parts of the Earth, which makes that it is light 
relatively to them” (Descartes 1644, IV, §22; 1996, 9-2: 211).24  
In Newton’s Principia, much of Book II was designed to prove that the 
phenomena of the Solar System cannot be accounted for by ether vortices (not, at 
any rate, under Newton’s Laws of Motion). And Newton’s well-known declaration 
that he does not feign hypotheses, coming as it does right after his admission that he 
has been unable to assign a cause to gravity, can surely be read as a gibe at the 
ether-based Cartesian theories. In Part III, §44, of his Principia, Descartes declared 
that he did not claim to have found the “genuine truth” concerning the physical 
questions he dealt with, and that what he would henceforth write about them 
should be understood “as an hypothesis” (the French translation adds: “that is 
perhaps very far from the truth”; as I pointed out in footnote 24, this is probably 
from Descartes own hand). Nevertheless, if every consequence inferred from such 
an hypothesis fully agrees with experience, “we shall gather from it no less utility for 
life than from the knowledge of truth itself” (1644, III, §44; 1996, vol. 8, p. 99).25 
In unwitting (or was it deliberate?) opposition to Descartes’ words, Newton’s First 
Rule of Philosophy prescribes that no causes of natural things should be admitted 
unless they are true (Newton 1726, p. 387; 1999, p. 794). For the purposes of 
human science, it is enough that a natural thing like gravity “really exists and acts 
according to the laws than [one has] set forth and is sufficient to explain all the 
motions” that one links to it.26 “To tell us that every Species of Things is endow'd 
                                            
24  I quote from Picot’s French translation, which is more explicit than the Latin. Many of 
the additions in Part III, §§ 41ff. and in Part IV, were probably written by Descartes 
himself (see Adam’s Avertissement in Descartes 1996, vol. 9-2, pp. ix-xix). For a 
sympathetic exposition of Cartesian theories of gravity, see Aiton 1972, or the shorter 
presentation in Aiton 1989. 
25  Again, the French translation explains: “…for one will be able to employ it in the same 
way to dispose natural causes to produce the effects one will desire”; see Descartes 
1996, 9: 123 
26  In the century following Newton, the finest physicists, such as d’Alembert or Fourier, 
insisted that they did not seek for causes but for laws. But the run-of-the-mill 
scientific practitioners obscurely thought of gravity as a force of attraction exercised 
by, say, the Sun as it were through a bodiless arm that stretches all the way from it to 
the Earth to grab it and pull it, while at the same time prompting the arm of the 
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with an occult specifick Quality by which it acts and produces manifest Effects, is 
to tell us nothing: But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from 
Phænomena, and afterwards to tell us how the Properties and Actions of all 
corporeal Things follow from those manifest Principles, would be a very great step in 
Philosophy, though the Causes of those Principles were not yet discover'd” (Newton 
1721, p. 377). 
Newton’s methodological attitude did not favor the ether, which, being 
intangible and invisible, can only exist hypothetically. During the 18th century, as 
Newton’s influence grew, the ether became increasingly discredited. By 1771 the 
enlightened founders of Encyclopedia Britannica thought it appropriate to explain 
‘ether’ as “the name of an imaginary fluid, supposed by several authors […] to be 
the cause […] of every phenomenon in nature”.27 Not without irony, Joseph 
Priestley extolled the “fine scene” that ether afforded “for ingenious speculation”: 
 
Here the imagination may have full play, in conceiving of the manner in 
which an invisible agent produces an almost infinite variety of visible effects. 
As the agent is invisible, every philosopher is at liberty to make it whatever 
he pleases, and ascribe to it such properties and powers as are most 
convenient for his purpose. 
(Priestley 1775, vol. 2, p. 16; quoted by Laudan 1981, p. 159) 
 
In 1784, LeSage, author of the last great ether theory of gravity (which many 
decades later James Clerk Maxwell judged favorably), declared he would stop 
publishing about it: “Since your physicists are so prejudiced against the possibility of 
solidly establishing the existence of my imperceptible agents, which nevertheless are 
most suitable (très-propres) for making intelligible the attractions, affinities and 
extensibilities (expansibilités) which currently constitute all of physics, I shall 
                                                                                                                                  
Earth to stretch as well and to grab and pull the Sun in turn. I have met engineers 
who appear to think so to this day. 
27  First edition (1771), 1: 31, s.v. ether; quoted by Laudan (1981), p. 170. The article 
éther in Diderot’s Encyclopédie is only mildly less sarcastic: “L'éther ne tombant pas sous 
les sens & étant employé uniquement ou en faveur d'une hypothèse, ou pour expliquer 
quelques phénomenes reels ou imaginaires, les Physiciens se donnent la liberté de 
l'imaginer à leur fantaisie”. (This article is signed by the British authors Harris and 
Chambers.) 
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suspend still for some time the publication of the works I prepared about these 
agents.”28  
Newton’s undisputed authority presided also over Ampère’s construction of 
electrodynamics in terms of attractive and repulsive forces acting instantaneously at 
a distance between centers of force (which, however, to save the phenomena, 
Ampère had to conceive, paradoxically, as oriented line elements—not points!). 
From then on, until the experimental discovery of electromagnetic waves by Hertz 
late in the 19th century, French and German electrodynamics remained wedded to 
action at a distance —instantaneous or deferred—, while “la physique anglaise”29 
persistently took the contrary view, namely, that electric and magnetic action 
properly has its seat, not in the ordinary massive bodies that display it to our eyes, 
but in the intangible, pervasive ether in which these bodies are embedded. The 
“English” (in fact, mainly Scottish and Irish) approach was inspired by the wish to 
produce a physico-mathematical theory that would embody the ideas of Michael 
Faraday, whose mind-boggling discoveries had revolutionized the science of 
electricity, but who, for lack of a formal education, had been unable to convey his 
views in precise mathematical form. Yet Faraday’s views —as far as we, assisted by 
our hindsight, can judge them now— were much closer to Einstein’s than the ether-
based theories of Maxwell and his followers. At any rate, Faraday did not hide his 
dislike for the ether hypothesis and openly favored the attribution of physical 
existence to curves in space that he termed electric and magnetic lines of force, but 
which, in today’s mathematical jargon, we would describe as the integral curves of 
the electric and the magnetic vector fields.30 
                                            
28  Quoted in French by Laudan (1981, p. 166), from Prevost 1805, p. 242. My 
translation. 
29  Duhem (1914), 1e partie, Ch. IV, §§IV-IX. For Duhem, “English physics”, as practiced 
by the Victorian electrodynamicians from Maxwell to Larmor, is a paradigm of 
broadmindedness (amplitude d’esprit), which is not always a virtue; according to 
Duhem, a man in whom this form of intelligence, “which Pascal calls broadness and 
weakness of mind, was developed to an almost monstrous degree” was the un-French 
emperor of the French, Napoleon I (1914, p. 81).  
30 Given a vector field V on a smooth manifold M, every smooth curve in M whose 
tangent vector at each point of its range is identical with the value of V at that point 
is an integral curve of V. Cf. Kobayashi and Nomizu (1963), 1: 12; Choquet-Bruhat et 
al. 1977, p. 141. 
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 Faced with this curious combination of facts, a thoughtful student of history 
cannot help wondering what could motivate the persistent attachment of Victorian 
physicists to the electromagnetic ether. To me at least, now that a full century has 
elapsed since Einstein declared it “superfluous”, the 19th-century revival of this pre-
Newtonian fantasy appears as a step back, unworthy of such refined 
mathematicians as William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), James Clerk Maxwell, George 
Francis FitzGerald and Joseph Larmor. Why did they so unhesitatingly take it for 
granted that, if electric and magnetic action happens chiefly in the space between 
the observable bodies, then that space must be filled by a material substance of a 
special kind, in which all other substances are soaked but which remains impervious 
to chemical analysis? More on line with our present inquiry, we may well ask the 
following question: Could an energetic, efficient HPS department, working in 
Cambridge, England, ca. 1850, have prevented this seemingly wrongheaded move? 
Questions of counterfactual history should no doubt be addressed only in a sportive 
mood. Still, by toying with the purely speculative answers that such questions allow, 
it is sometimes possible to improve our grasp of the concepts we use. 
To begin with, let us recall that the light-ether, which Einstein found 
superfluous, had been revived, together with the wave theory of light, by Thomas 
Young, some fifty years before Maxwell’s earliest publications on 
electromagnetism.31 Young’s proposal was strongly resisted, especially by the French 
scientific establishment, in the name of the corpuscular conception of light, which 
was thought to be backed by the authority of Newton. However, as far as I know, 
nobody doubted that if light is transmitted by waves, then there must exist a 
vibrating body that fills interstellar space and also permeates air, water, glass, and 
generally all transparent bodies. It should be noted that the same French scientists 
that opposed the wave theory of light and, with it, the light-ether, had no 
reservations against other imponderable fluids, capable of permeating ordinary 
bodies, notably caloric, which they held responsible for heat, in opposition to the 
kinetic conception defended about the same time by Rumford (1798). They all 
embraced the ether hypothesis together with the wave theory when Poisson, 
wishing to embarrass Fresnel, inferred from the latter’s wave optics that a bright spot 
would be seen at the center of the shadow of a small circular screen and this 
seemingly implausible prediction was fulfilled (Whittaker 1951/53, vol. 1, p. 108). 
                                            
31  Young 1800, 1802a, 1802b, 1804. I owe these references to Buchwald 1981, p. 235. 
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Indeed, no less a mathematician than Cauchy took it upon himself to dream up the 
molecular structure of ether in various ways.32 His constructions allowed him to infer 
the optical phenomena of dispersion and double refraction, but little else. In a spirit 
very close to that of our present inquiry, Jed Buchwald asks why it was “necessary 
for Cauchy to embrace the hypothesis of a molecular ether if (as was almost 
certainly the case) he was primarily interested in discovering and solving differential 
equations for light?” Buchwald’s reply deserves attention: 
  
Without the hypothesis of a molecular ether there would, at the time, simply 
have been no route at all to the mathematics. For, although the ultimate aim 
for Cauchy was always a mathematical proposition from which calculable 
phenomena could be deduced, this aim could only be achieved throughout 
most of the 1830s by deductions founded on a molecular ether. Moreover, 
there was then little to object to, because the hypothesis fitted so well into 
contemporary physical ideas; that is, it utilised the widely accepted concepts 
of material points and central forces. 
(Buchwald 1981, pp. 223-24) 
 
Similar considerations can probably account also for other contemporary work on 
ether dynamics, notably by James MacCullagh (1839).33  
                                            
32  “Within the space of ten years the great French mathematician produced two distinct 
theories of crystal-optics and three distinct theories of reflection, almost all yielding 
correct or nearly correct final formulae, and yet mostly irreconcilable with each other 
and involving incorrect boundary conditions and improbable relations between elastic 
constants” (Whittaker 1951/53, 1: 137). As Poincaré (1901b) remarked in connection 
with a later ether theory: “Les hypothèses, c’est le fonds qui manque le moins” (“There 
is no dearth of hypotheses”; quoted from Poincaré 1968, p. 182). 
33  For further references, see Whittaker (1951/53), 1: 137n. MacCullagh’s paper of 1839 
is discussed in Darrigol (2005), pp. 237-239 (followed by an extract in French 
translation, pp. 241-248). See also Stein (1981), pp. 310-315. Darrigol (2000), pp. 
190f, 334f., explains the importance of MacCullagh’s ether for FitzGerald and Larmor. 
Although it differed drastically from any material ever considered in the received 
physics of elastic bodies, MacCullagh’s medium agrees with the boundary conditions 
required by Fresnel’s laws of reflection and refraction; its equations of motion follow 
from Hamilton’s principle and, suitably interpreted, they yield the Maxwell equations 
(in the absence of sources). 
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About the same time, the great Cambridge philosopher and historian of science 
William Whewell moved away from Newton’s Rules of Philosophy and expressed his 
willingness to countenance hypotheses in the “inductive sciences”, provided that 
they meet certain conditions. To be acceptable, an hypothesis must not only (a) be 
“consistent with all the observed facts”; but (b) it ought to correctly foretell 
“phenomena which have not yet been observed” (Whewell 1847, 2: 62). “Such a 
coincidence of untried facts with speculative assertions cannot be the work of 
chance, but implies some large portion of truth in the principles on which the 
reasoning is founded” (ibid., vol. 2, p. 64). The corroboration of wave optics by 
Poisson’s bright spot at the center of the circular screen’s shadow admirably 
illustrates condition (b). Larry Laudan (1981, pp. 176ff.) claims therefore that 
Whewell’s restoration of the hypothetico-deductive method was inspired in 
particular by the success of wave optics and the ether hypothesis supposedly 
inherent to it. If true, this claim entails a negative answer to my question about the 
possible role of a counterfactual Cambridge HPS department in exorcising the 
ether; for Whewell, Master of Trinity since 1841, surely would have exercised an 
enormous influence on the composition and orientation of such a department. 
Indeed he probably played the opposite role in real life, by instilling in Maxwell —
who was a student and later a fellow at Trinity in the 1850s— an enduring loyalty 
to ether, which seems unnecessary to us, given the mathematical resources at 
Maxwell’s command. However, I am not sure that Laudan’s claim is warranted, for 
even if Whewell’s attitude to hypotheses had something to do with the successful 
prediction of unsuspected phenomena by Fresnel’s wave optics,34 that would not 
yet say anything about the assumption of an ether, which certainly did not occur as 
a premise in the deduction of those phenomena, but served rather as a means of 
reconciling the mathematical theory with the ordinary metaphysical prejudices of 
the time.35 
                                            
34  They certainly inspired the similar attitude of John Herschel (1830, cf. pp. 32-33, 
196-197, 207, 261-262). 
35  Laudan (1981) does not produce any textual evidence for the connection between 
Whewell’s attitude toward hypotheses in general and the ether hypothesis in 
particular and I have not been able to find any in Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences, where, by the way, he lists Cauchy’s ether among several “precarious 
hypotheses” (1847, 1: 491). 
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Be that as it may, Faraday, who remained free from scholastic prejudices thanks 
to the same contingencies that prevented him from receiving a good mathematical 
education, had little sympathy for the light-ether and did not conceal his inclination 
to do without it when the Faraday effect36 he discovered in 1845 confirmed his 
suspicion that light might be intimately related to electromagnetism. In a letter he 
wrote to Richard Phillips on 15 April 1846 and which was published as “Thoughts 
on Ray-Vibrations” (Faraday 1846), he explains that by regarding the “ultimate 
atoms” of matter “as centres of force, and not as so many little bodies surrounded by 
forces […] and capable of existing without them”, he was gradually led to look at 
the lines of force, which issue from every atom on this view, “as being perhaps the 
seat of vibrations of radiant phenomena”. This notion “will dispense with the aether, 
which in another view, is supposed to be the medium in which these vibrations take 
place.” After briefly discussing the “lines of gravitating force” between ponderable 
particles, Faraday proceeds: 
 
The lines of electric and magnetic action are by many considered as exerted 
through space like the lines of gravitating force. For my own part, I incline to 
believe that when there are intervening particles of matter (being themselves 
only centres of force), they take part in carrying on the force through the 
line, but that when there are none, the line proceeds through space. 
Whatever the view adopted respecting them may be, we can, at all events, 
affect these lines of force in a manner which may be conceived as partaking 
of the nature of a shake or lateral vibration. 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
It may be asked, what lines of force are there in nature which are fitted to 
convey such an action and supply for the vibrating theory the place of the 
aether? I do not pretend to answer this question with any confidence; all I 
can say is, that I do not perceive in any part of space, whether (to use the 
common phrase) vacant or filled with matter, anything but forces and the 
lines in which they are exerted. The lines of weight or gravitating force are, 
certainly, extensive enough to answer in this respect any demand made 
upon them by radiant phaenomena; and so, probably, are the lines of 
magnetic force. 
                                            
36  The Faraday effect is the rotation of the plane of polarization experienced by a beam of 
plane polarized light when it passes in the direction of the magnetic lines of force 
through certain materials —e.g. water, heavy flint glass, quartz— exposed to a strong 
magnetic field. See Faraday (1855), pp. 1-11. 
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…………………………………………………………………………………… 
The view which I am so bold to put forth considers, therefore, radiation as a 
kind of species of vibration in the lines of force which are known to connect 
particles and also masses of matter together. It endeavors to dismiss the 
aether, but not the vibration. The kind of vibration which, I believe, can 
alone account for the wonderful, varied, and beautiful phaenomena of 
polarization, is not the same as that which occurs on the surface of disturbed 
water, or the waves of sound in gases or liquids, for the vibrations in these 
cases are direct, or to and from the centre of action, whereas the former are 
lateral. It seems to me, that the resultant of two or more lines of force is in an 
apt condition for that action which may be considered as equivalent to a 
lateral vibration; whereas a uniform medium, like the aether, does not appear 
apt, or more apt than air or water. 
(Faraday 1855, pp. 450-451) 
 
Lines of force made their first appearance within the field-theoretic approach to 
gravity and electrostatics developed earlier by some Continental mathematicians,37 
and Faraday is plainly alluding to them. However, such lines and their tangent 
vectors were apparently regarded by everyone except Faraday as powerful aids for 
calculating the actual and virtual effects of forces acting at a distance, and not as 
fitting representations of physical realities. Only the mathematically untutored 
English genius endorsed the now common view that physical realities may and 
indeed ought to be conceived as models (in the model-theoretic sense, i.e. 
realizations) of mathematical structures. By contrast, the most mathematical among 
                                            
37  Duhem (1914, p. 99) observes that, in dealing with electrostatics, “a French or 
German physicist, such as Poisson or Gauss, mentally places in space […] this 
abstraction called a material point, accompanied by that other abstraction called an 
electric charge, and thereupon seeks to calculate a third abstraction, viz., the force to 
which the material point is subjected; he gives formulas that allow one to determine 
the magnitude and the direction of that force, for every possible position of this 
material point, and infers a series of consequences from these formulas. He shows, in 
particular, that at each point of space, the force is directed following the tangent of a 
certain line, the line of force; that all the lines of force meet at right angles certain 
surfaces, whose equation he gives, the equipotential surfaces.” A significant 
counterexample to Duhem’s ethnography is the English mathematician George Green 
(1828), who generalized and extended Poisson’s investigations concerning electricity 
and magnetism and even anticipated Gauss’s use of the term ‘potential’ for the scalar 
field whose gradient is the field of vectors tangent to the lines of force. 
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the British physicists paid obeisance —or was it only lip service?— to Kelvin’s 
criterion of intelligibility: “It seems to me that the test of ‘Do we or not understand a 
particular subject in physics?’ is ‘Can we make a mechanical model of it?’” (Kargon 
and Achinstein 1987, p. 111).38 Coming from someone who about the same time 
had declared that “we have no right to assume that there may not be something else 
that our philosophy does not dream of” (ibid., p. 41), this was indeed an amazingly 
restrictive demand; but it held Maxwell and the Maxwellians in awe.39  
Mechanical modeling, as understood by Kelvin, involved looking for “the 
explanation of all phenomena of electro-magnetic attraction or repulsion, and of 
electro-magnetic induction […] simply in the inertia and pressure” of matter 
(Thomson 1857, p. 200; quoted by Harman 1998, pp. 99-100). In the same 
Baltimore lectures of 1884 in which he stated the said criterion, Kelvin told his 
audience they “must not listen to any suggestion that we must look upon the 
luminiferous ether as an ideal way of putting the thing. A real matter between us 
                                            
38  The two occurrences of ‘model’ in the above sentences illustrate two current meanings 
of the word that should not be confused, for they are not merely different but point, if 
I may say so, in opposite directions. In the branch of logic known as model theory, a 
model of a structure of a given species is any set endowed with structural features that 
satisfy the requirements of that species. In the more ordinary acceptance in which the 
word is used in the Kelvin quotation, a model is a representation of an individual or 
generic object by a real or ideal object of a different sort, such as a cardboard model of 
a Greek temple, or the familiar model of a pendulum, consisting of a weightless 
inextensible string with a massive dimensionless particle at one end, affixed by the 
other end to a frictionless nail. The common inclination to confuse both meanings may 
be due to the fact that today theoretical physics generally represents physical 
processes and situations by models in the second sense which are models in the first 
sense of specific mathematical structures (generally not the streamlined ones that are 
studied by the several branches of pure mathematics, but ad hoc combinations of 
them). 
39  The index to Hunt (1991), s.v. ‘ether models’, mentions Oliver Lodge’s cogwheel 
ether, FitzGerald’s paddlewheel ether, Poynting’s turbine-spring ether, Maxwell’s 
vortex and idle-wheel ether, and FitzGerald’s wheel and band ether; pp. 96-104 of 
the same book describe FitzGerald’s vortex sponge ether of 1885. Chapter IX of 
Whittaker (1951/53), vol. 1, is devoted to “Models of the ether”. See also in Buchwald 
(1985), pp. 146-150, the discussion of “ether rupture” and Larmor’s difficulty in 
dealing with it.  
Philosophical criticism and the advancement of science 29 
and the remotest stars I believe there is, and that light consists of real motions of that 
matter” (Kargon and Achinstein 1987, p. 12). 
In his three major papers on electromagnetism, Maxwell (1856, 1861/62, 1864) 
carried to different lengths the enterprise of modeling, screwing “the focussing glass 
of theory” —as he said— “sometimes to one pitch of definition, and sometimes to 
another, so as to see down into different depths” (Maxwell, 1990-2002, 1: 377; 
quoted by Harman 1998, p. 82). But he never flinched in his adhesion to the ether 
hypothesis. The paper “On Faraday’s Lines of Force” (1855/56) seeks only “to shew 
how, by a strict application of the ideas and methods of Faraday, the connexion of 
the very different orders of phenomena which he has discovered may be clearly 
placed before de mathematical mind” (Maxwell 1890, 1: 157-158). Although 
Faraday’s style of thought was “very generally supposed to be of an indefinite and 
unmathematical character” (p. 157), Maxwell regarded Faraday’s lines of force as 
evidence that he was “in reality a mathematician of a very high order” (Maxwell 
1890, 2: 360). In Maxwell’s formulation the electric (or, respectively, magnetic) 
lines of force form a congruence of curves in space, i.e. a set of curves such that one 
and only one of them passes through each point of space, and represents the 
direction of the force that would act on a positively electrified particle (or, 
respectively, an elementary north pole) placed at that point (Maxwell 1890, 1: 
158). According to Maxwell, we “thus obtain a geometrical model of the physical 
phenomena, which would tell us the direction of the force, but we should still 
require some method of indicating the intensity of the force at any point” (ibid.). 40 
However, “if we consider these curves not as mere lines, but as fine tubes of variable 
section carrying an incompressible fluid, then, since the velocity of the fluid is 
inversely as the section of the tube, we may make the velocity vary according to any 
given law, by regulating the section of the tube, and in this way we might represent 
the intensity of the force as well as its direction by the motion of the fluid in these 
tubes” (pp. 158-159). Despite any appearances to the contrary, this is not intended 
to be a mechanical model of the electrical (or magnetic) field. On this point, 
Maxwell is emphatic: 
 
                                            
40  By a suitable parametrization of the lines of force one could ensure that the vector 
tangent to each such curve at each point reflects not only the direction of the force at 
this point but also its intensity. But in 1856 any parameter other than arc length may 
have seemed ungeometrical to Maxwell’s readers.  
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The substance here treated of must not be assumed to possess any of the 
properties of ordinary fluids except those of freedom of motion and resistance 
to compression. It is not even a hypothetical fluid which is introduced to 
explain actual phenomena. It is merely a collection of imaginary properties 
which may be employed for establishing certain theorems in pure 
mathematics in a way more intelligible to many minds and more applicable 
to physical problems than that in which algebraic symbols alone are used. 
(Maxwell 1856, in Maxwell 1990, 1: 160; my italics) 
 
Thus, the “substance” in question is neither more nor less than a bundle of precisely 
defined properties (and relations), that is, the bare embodiment of a mathematical 
structure; and the familiar word ‘fluid’ is here stripped of “every meaning except 
that which is warranted by the phenomena themselves” (Maxwell 1890, 2: 359). 
In his second paper, “On Physical Lines of Force” (1861/62), Maxwell valiantly 
proposes a mechanical model of the ether. Electricity and magnetism depend on 
the presence of molecular vortices in it.41 The model allowed the existence of 
transverse waves propagating in the ether with a speed equal to the ratio between 
the electrostatic and the electromagnetic unit. Back to town from the country house 
where he worked out this result, Maxwell verified that this value, as established by 
Weber and Kohlrausch (1857) differed by less than 1.5% from the speed of light, 
as it was then known. Maxwell concluded: 
 
The velocity of transverse undulations in our hypothetical medium […] 
agrees so exactly with the velocity of light […] that we can scarcely avoid 
the inference that light consists in the transverse undulations of the same 
medium with is the cause of electric and magnetic phenomena.  
(Maxwell 1890, 1: 500) 
 
At the time Maxwell did not draw the further conclusion that light is an 
electromagnetic phenomenon. He conceived optical and electromagnetic processes 
in mechanical terms, the relation between them being “expressed by the molecular 
connection between ether and matter, in terms of different motions in the ether” 
(Harman 1998, p. 109). Thus, the generally acknowledged reality of the optical 
                                            
41  We need not go here into details. The model has been repeatedly explained in the 
literature. In particular, the quaint illustration printed facing Maxwell (1890), 1: 488 
(Plate VIII, fig. 2), can also be found in Tricker (1966), p. 118, Siegel (1991), p. 41, 
Harman (1998), p. 104, and Darrigol (2000), p. 150. 
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ether could be regarded  as supporting the ether hypothesis in the theory of 
electromagnetism.42 
 Maxwell’s mechanical model was clever but coarse. On 23 December 1867, he 
wrote to Tait that “the nature of this mechanism is to the true mechanism what an 
orrery43 is to the solar system” (Maxwell, 1990-2002, 2: 337; quoted by Darrigol 
2000, p. 154). In “A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field” (1864) he 
made no attempt at creating a more accurate model. Instead he based the theory 
on Hamilton’s principle.44 By showing that his field equations comply with the 
requirements of this principle Maxwell proves that the electromagnetic phenomena 
described or predicted by the equations can be explained by the mechanical 
behavior of a peculiar substance that permeates all ordinary bodies and completely 
fills the space between them.45 Never mind that he does not give us an inkling of 
                                            
42  In the paper of 1864, Maxwell proceeded “to investigate whether [the] properties of 
that which constitutes the electromagnetic field, deduced from electromagnetic 
phenomena alone, are sufficient to explain the propagation of light through the same 
substance” (1890, 1: 577), and he tentatively concluded that yes, “light and 
magnetism are affections of the same substance, and that light is an electromagnetic 
disturbance propagate through the field according to electromagnetic laws” (1: 580). 
43  “Orrery [Named after Chas. Boyle, Earl of Orrery, for whom a copy of the machine 
invented by George Graham c 1700 was made by J. Rowley, an instrument-maker.] A 
piece of mechanism devised to represent the motions of the planets about the sun by 
means of clockwork” (Oxford English Dictionary). 
44  Following this method, one constructs a Lagrangian function L, whose value at each 
instant represents the difference between the kinetic energy T and the potential 
energy U stored at that instant in the physical system under consideration, and one 
assumes Hamilton’s principle, according to which the temporal evolution of the 
system is always such that the integral Ldt? takes an extremal value, i.e. such that 
? Ldt? = 0 . Since the value of this integral is conventionally known as ‘action’, 
Hamilton’s principle is also referred to, with mild impropriety, as the Principle of Least 
Action. 
45  Or, in Poincaré’s lucid words: “Maxwell ne donne pas une explication mécanique de 
l’électricité et du magnétisme; il se borne a démontrer que cette explication est possible” 
(1901a, p. iv). Lorentz’s words point in the same direction: “Maxwell fait voir 
comment les principes de la mécanique peuvent servir à élucider les questions 
d’électrodynamique et la théorie des courants induits, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de 
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how exactly such a mechanical explanation could be carried out. “To demonstrate 
the possibility of a mechanical explanation of electricity, we do not have to worry to 
find this explanation itself; it is enough for us to know the expression of the two 
functions T and U that are the two parts of the energy, to form the Lagrange 
equations with these two functions and to compare these equations with the 
experimental laws. […] As soon as the functions U(qk) and T(q?k, qk) exist, one can 
find an infinity of mechanical explanations of the phenomenon” (Poincaré 1901a, 
p. viii).46 
Thus it is not wholly inaccurate to say that the ether in 1864, though still quite 
new to electrodynamics, was already being cast by Maxwell for the Cheshire cat 
part it later played so skillfully under Lorentz.47 There was, however, one significant 
philosophical reason for Maxwell’s retention of the ether hypothesis. He expected to 
account for electric currents and electrostatic charge distributions as epiphenomena 
of ether dynamics. This would spare physicists the need to postulate one or two 
special electric fluids (as they did in the 18th century) or to acknowledge electric 
charge as a primitive property of matter (as they have been doing since the 1890s). 
Maxwell’s ether eludes our senses and was endowed by him and other researchers 
with either a far-fetched or an altogether unperspicuous mechanical structure, but 
it was only assigned properties or relations that could be conceived in classical 
mechanical terms. However, in the last quarter of the 19th century, the discovery of 
new effects (Kerr 1877, Hall 1879) and the progress of experimental research on 
                                                                                                                                  
pénétrer le secret du mécanisme qui produit les phénomènes” (1892a, in Lorentz 1935-39, 
1: 164; my italics). 
46  Maxwell was well aware of this. He writes near the end of his Treatise (1891, 2: 470): 
“The problem of determining the mechanism required to establish a given species of 
connexion between the motions of the parts of a system always admits of an infinite 
number of solutions. Of these, some may be more clumsy or some more complex than 
others, but all must satisfy the conditions of mechanism in general”, that is , the 
conditions entailed by Hamilton’s principle, or by the Euler-Lagrange differential 
equations mentioned by Poincaré, which are necessary and sufficient for ? Ldt? to be 
zero. Cf. also Maxwell’s classical description of a belfry as a mechanical system (1890, 
2: 783-784; quoted in extenso in Buchwald 1985, p. 21). 
47  I owe the comparison between Maxwell’s ether and Carroll’s cat to Tricker (1966, p. 
109); but it may well have been intended by Carroll himself (just as his Humpty 
Dumpty mimics the speech of mathematicians). 
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the conduction of electricity in electrolytes and gases (see Darrigol 2000, ch. 7) led 
Lorentz (1892a) and Larmor (1894, 1895) to assume the existence of electrically 
charged particles of ordinary matter, which were the sources of the force fields 
located in the ether and also the objects of their accelerative action.48 This 
important step received decisive and apparently irreversible experimental support 
when J.J. Thomson “discovered the electron” (1897),49 i.e. when he successfully 
identified cathode rays with a spurt or stream of negatively charged elementary 
particles. After that, one could no longer expect to understand electric charges and 
currents as mechanical effects in the ether. 
In the highly acclaimed electrodynamic theory —or ought we to say theories?— 
of Lorentz, the ether is completely motionless and its mechanical structure and 
behavior —if it has any— is of no concern at all. As Whittaker lucidly wrote: “Such 
an aether is simply space endowed with certain dynamical properties” (1951/53, 
1:393). It is therefore no wonder that, despite Lorentz explicit warning to the 
contrary,50 the general public, including most philosophers and even some 
physicists, identified his ether with Newton’s absolute space, or at any rate assumed 
that it was at rest in it.51 Still, the idea that this elusive form of matter was part of the 
                                            
48  This transition “from Maxwell to microphysics” was persuasively described by 
Buchwald (1985).  
49  The word ‘electron’ was introduced by Stoney (1881) as a term of art for the quantity 
of electricity, “the same in all cases”, which traverses an electrolyte “for each chemical 
bond which is ruptured within” it, in other words, the electrolytic quantum. Larmor 
(1894) designated with it his new elementary charged particles (§§114-125: 
“Introduction of Free Electrons”). Lorentz began using the word five years later (1899, 
p. 507; French translation in Lorentz 1935-39, 5: 139); in his German book of 1895 
he spoke of “Ionen”. 
50  “When I say for brevity’s sake that the ether is at rest, I mean only that no part of this 
medium is displaced with respect to its other parts and that all perceptible motions of 
the heavenly bodies are motion relative to the ether” (Lorentz 1895, §1, in Lorentz 
1935-1939, 5: 4). I gather from this that one should regard Lorentz’s ether as a body 
at rest in the so-called firmament, i.e., the inertial frame of the fixed stars constructed 
by astronomers. 
51  In the light of §1, the ironic implications of this are clear. If Lorentz’s ether is 
absolutely at rest, then Newton’s absolute space is no longer idle, but plays an 
essential role, not in mechanics though, but in electrodynamics (and optics). This 
conferred a non-relativistic character to Newton’s physics and caused SR to appear 
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furniture of the universe had become deeply entrenched during the 19th century, 
and nobody seemed willing to dismiss it. Surely it is not easy for a highly respected 
profession to admit that one of its time-honored terms of art is a noun without a 
referent.52 Even Poincaré, who in 1889 had predicted that “the day will doubtless 
come when the ether will be rejected as useless”,53 at the Paris Congress of Physics of 
1901 argued thus for believing in it: 
 
We know where our belief in ether comes from. If we receive light from a 
distant star, for several years that light is no longer at the star and is not yet on 
the Earth. It must therefore be somewhere, sustained, so to speak, by some 
material support. The same idea can be expressed in a more mathematical 
and more abstract way. What we record are the changes suffered by material 
molecules; we see, for example, that our photographic film displays the 
consequences of phenomena staged many years earlier in the incandescent 
mass of the star. Now, in ordinary mechanics, the state of the system under 
study depends only on its state in an immediately preceding state; the system 
therefore satisfies differential equations. But if we did not believe in the 
ether, the state of the material universe would depend not only on the 
                                                                                                                                  
much more un-Newtonian than it is. If the spacetime structure underlying Newtonian 
mechanics had been duly acknowledged before 1900, the continuity with SR would 
have been obvious. In either system any congruence of parallel timelike geodesics 
determined a privileged frame of reference, equivalent to every other such frame; 
though, of course, the respective spacetime geometries have different symmetry 
groups, namely. the Poincaré-Lorentz group in SR, and the so-called Galilei group in 
Newtonian mechanics. But again this points to a continuity, inasmuch as the latter 
may be regarded as a degenerate limiting case of the former. 
52  We see even today that some scientists and philosophers who share the common 
prejudices concerning the epistemic status of physics will not easily acknowledge that 
the ether, whose dynamics and molecular structure absorbed the attention of so many 
great minds, simply does not exist. Maybe they feel this is like saying that Cuvier or 
Darwin spent years studying the physiology and histology of the unicorn. 
53  “Peu nous importe que l’éther existe réellement, c’est l’affaire des métaphysiciens; 
l’essentiel pour nous c’est que tout se passe comme s’il existait et que cette hypothèse 
est commode pour l’explication des phénomènes. Après tout, avons-nous d’autre 
raison de croire à l’existence des objets matériels? Ce n’est là aussi qu’une hypothèse 
commode ; seulement elle ne cessera jamais de l’être, tandis qu’un jour viendra sans 
doute où l’éther sera rejeté comme inutile” (Poincaré 1889. préface; quoted from 
Poincaré 1968, p. 215). 
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immediately preceding state (l’état immédiatement antérieur), but on much 
older states; the system would satisfy finite difference equations. To avoid 
this derogation of the general laws of mechanics we have invented the 
ether.54 
 
Poincaré went on to say that Fizeau’s experiment makes you feel you are 
touching the ether with your finger (“on croit toucher l’éther du doigt”—Poincaré 
1968, p. 181). I need not describe this experiment here.55 It was designed to test 
Fresnel’s ether drag formula. According to Fresnel, the ether is partially dragged by 
the bodies it permeates. Any body in motion carries with it precisely the amount of 
ether it contains in excess of what would be found inside the same volume of 
otherwise empty space. If n is the refractive index of a transparent material m, then, 
according to Fresnel (and Young), n2 = ?m/?, where ?m is the density of ether inside 
a body made of m and ? is the density of ether outside all bodies. The density of the 
ether dragged by this body is (?m ? ?) = (n2 ? 1)?, while a quantity of ether of 
density ? remains at rest. Let c be the speed of light in interstellar space. The speed 
of light inside the said body is then cn–1. Let the body travel in interstellar space 
with constant speed v in the same direction as light is sent through the body. Then, 
the center of gravity of the ether contained in the body moves in this direction with 
constant speed equal to (n2 ? 1)n–2v. Let cv denote the speed —relative to the 
interstellar sea of ether— of light propagating inside a transparent body of refractive 
index n in the direction in which the body travels with speed v. Then, under 
Fresnel’s assumption and the classical rule for the composition of velocities, 
 
 cv =
c
n
+
n2 ?1
n2
v = cn?1 + 1? 1
n2
?
??
?
?? v   (9) 
 
                                            
54  Poincaré (1901b); translated by me from Poincaré (1968), pp. 180-181. I cannot 
repress the feeling that Poincaré the mathematician must have known (i) that if a 
given physical state depends on another in accordance with a system of differential 
equations, none of the two states can immediately precede (or follow) the other one, 
and (ii) that time dependent vector fields can be defined on space without assuming a 
material support for them to sit on. I suppose (ii) is the reason why he talks of inventing 
the ether at the end of this tirade about believing in it.  
55  Fizeau (1851). The experiment is described in Darrigol (2000), pp. 315-316; also in 
Janssen and Stachel (in press), p. 13. Both this paper and Stachel (2005) contain 
important remarks about the significance of Fizeau’s experiment.  
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Fizeau (1851) verified formula (9) by letting light travel along two parallel tubes in 
which water flowed in opposite directions. Fizeau’s experiment, which was repeated 
with greater accuracy and the same positive result by Michelson and Morley 
(1886), is a true treasure-trove for philosophers, for it can be read in at least three 
very different ways, as confirming either (i) Fresnel’s ether drag hypothesis, as 
explained above; or (ii) Lorentz’s theory of the motionless ether, which also entails 
the so-called drag factor 1? 1
n2
?
??
?
?? , but does not attribute it to a partial ether drag; or 
(iii) Special Relativity. Indeed, under the SR rule for the composition of velocities, 
Fresnel’s purported ether drag turns out to be a purely kinematic effect, a 
consequence of substituting the moving body’s reference frame for that of the fixed 
stars, when both frames are related by a Lorentz transformation. (To be precise, the 
relativistic formula differs from Fresnel’s by a term of the second order in v/c.) It 
seems to me, however, that someone less adventurous than Einstein would not have 
dared to substitute reading (iii) for reading (ii); certainly not a mere HPS research 
worker.56 Indeed, there are good reasons to think that the scientific establishment 
would have continued to believe that Fizeau’s experiment allowed one to touch the 
Lorentz ether with one’s fingers, if Michelson and Morley’s failed attempt to 
ascertain the motion of the Earth in the ether had not belied, already in 1887, the 
success of their improved Fizeau experiment of 1886.57 Lorentz (1892b) sought to 
                                            
56  Not even Poincaré dared to do so (at least not openly), although in June 1905 he was 
in possession of all the mathematical and physical ingredients of SR. Giannetto (1998) 
provides sufficient evidence of this (though not enough, in my view, to establish his 
claim that “Poincaré must be considered the actual creator of special relativity”). 
57  Michelson and Morley’s experiment with the Michelson interferometer is described in 
practically every textbook on SR, usually from a relativistic standpoint. To get the 
perspective from which the experiment was designed, I recommend reading Michelson 
(1881). From the negative result of his experiment, Michelson drew neither (i) the 
relativistic conclusion customarily associated with it to day, nor (ii) the geostatic 
conclusion that Tycho Brahe or Roberto Bellarmino could have based on it. Instead, 
Michelson concluded that Gabriel Stokes (1845, 1846a, 1846b) was right in assuming 
that the local ether is dragged completely by the solid Earth, and in decreasing 
proportions by the atmosphere that surrounds it. Michelson therefore eventually had 
his experiment repeated on a mountain top. Had he lived much longer, he might have 
persuaded NASA to put an interferometer aboard a space shuttle. However, Lorentz 
(1886) had proved that Stokes conception of the total ether drag is untenable: the 
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reconcile these experimental results with the contraction hypothesis — also 
proposed independently by FitzGerald (1889)— which I mentioned in §2: because 
every macroscopic solid body is held together by presumably electric intermolecular 
forces, a metal rod traveling across the electromagnetic ether with constant speed v 
will contract in the direction of motion by the exact amount necessary to make its 
motion impossible to detect through observations accurate to the second order in 
v/c. This hypothesis is not so implausible as some philosophers have later said.58 
However, as Lorentz (1895, 1899, 1904) gradually realized, to properly do its job 
the contraction hypothesis had to be supplemented with the introduction of “local 
time”, which Lorentz conceived as a mere mathematical aid to calculation, but 
which will make very little sense unless real clocks in moving labs actually agree 
with it.59 As is well known, Lorentz’s mature theory of 1904, complete with rod 
contraction and clock retardation, is Lorentz-invariant60 and, despite profound 
                                                                                                                                  
flow of an incompressible fluid around a moving solid sphere cannot be irrotational 
and yet adhere to the sphere (Darrigol 2000, p. 317; Lorentz 1892c demonstrated a 
lemma he had used in his proof, viz., that Stokes theory must assume a velocity 
potential). 
58  They objected that the Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction hypothesis is “ad hoc”, as if one 
could ever design a good scientific hypothesis without having specifically in mind the 
phenomena it is meant to explain and the problems it is intended to solve. As Janssen 
(1995, pp. 160, 183) aptly notes, this unfair and misguided criticism of Lorentz and 
Fitzgerald has precious little to do with Einstein’s complaint (1907, pp. 412-413) that 
the contraction hypothesis was ad hoc in the sense that it was expressly devised to 
save the superfluous ether hypothesis. For a spirited and skillful defense of the 
Lorentz-FitzGerald approach see Brown (2005), ch. 4. 
59  Lorentz (1916, p. 321, n. 72*) acknowledged this and gave Einstein credit for it. 
However, he could have learned it before 1904 from Poincaré. On this issue see the 
illuminating and well documented exposition by Michel Janssen (1995), §3.5.4, pp. 
244-248.  
60  Eqns. (4) and (5) in Lorentz 1904, §4 (1935-39, 5: 175), include as a factor a 
function of velocity l(v), which is equal to 1 for v = 0 and “for small values of v, differs 
from unity no more than by a quantity of the second order”. This entails that the 
theory is only approximately Lorentz-invariant, and that an experiment with a higher 
order of accuracy could one day disclose the motion of the Earth in the ether. 
However, a few pages later Lorentz shows, by a tortuous physical argument, that l(v) 
must be constant and therefore equal to 1 (1935-39, 5: 187-188). On this condition, 
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conceptual differences, agrees exactly in every prediction with SR. This means that, 
although it postulates an ether, it does not afford any conceivable way of 
experimentally detecting its presence.61 At this point, the time was ripe for someone 
to call the bluff, as in Andersen’s tale.62 
                                                                                                                                  
the transformation proposed by Lorentz becomes what we now call a Lorentz 
transformation and the exact Lorentz-invariance of the theory is secured. However, 
Lorentz’s argument for l(v) = const. failed to convince Poincaré, who proved instead 
that the set of all transformations that satisfy Lorentz’s eqns. (4) and (5) form a group 
if and only if l(v) = 1 (Poincaré 1906, pp. 144-146). This in turn implies that the 
inverse of a given transformation is on a par with it, so that no privilege can be 
claimed for one of the coordinate systems mutually related by the transformation. 
Interestingly, Lorentz (1914), commenting on Poincaré (1906), asserted that his 
theory of 1904 was not exactly Lorentz-invariant. “My formulas —he says— remain 
loaded with certain terms that ought to have disappeared. These terms were too small 
to exercise a perceptible influence on the phenomena and I could thus explain the 
independence from the motion of the Earth that observations had disclosed; but I have 
not established the principle of relativity as rigorously and universally true.” (Lorentz 
1935/39, 7: 263). In a lecture delivered in Leiden, Paul Ehrenfest expressed a 
different view: “The etherless theory of Einstein demands exactly the same as the 
ether theory of Lorentz. […] As a matter of principle (ganz principiell), there is no 
experimentum crucis between these two theories” (1913, pp. 17-18). Lorentz 
attended this lecture and voiced no objections. See also Ehrenfest (1912), a discussion 
note concerning Einstein (1909), in which Ehrenfest, who apparently sympathized at 
that time with the etherless emission theory of light propounded by Ritz (1908), 
stresses that “the partisans of Einstein’s theory of relativity must wish that [in a 
practically viable experimentum crucis between the theories of Ritz and Lorentz] the 
partisans of the ether hypothesis should prevail over the partisans of the proper emission 
hypothesis” (p. 319). 
61  In his lectures concerning “Old and new problems of physics” (1910), Lorentz himself 
said, after describing the situation in electrodynamics that immediately preceded 
Einstein’s SR: “Hat es dann überhaupt einen Sinn vom Äther zu reden? Schliesslich 
ist ihm nur noch soviel Substantialität geblieben, dass man durch ihn ein 
Koordinatensystem festliegen kann” (Lorentz 1935-1939, 7: 210). And yet even this 
alleged possibility is unclear, given that there is no way of telling relative to which 
coordinate system the ether is at rest.  
62  Shortly before Einstein (1905), Alfred Bucherer (1903, 1904) and Emil Cohn (1904) 
put forward etherless theories of electromagnetic phenomena. However, they were not 
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Few will deny that, if the ether does not exist, the dismissal of the ether 
hypothesis was a major improvement of physics. It seems to me that, in principle, a 
critical thinker imbued in Newton’s methods (or Fourier’s!) and acquainted with 
the discoveries and ideas of Faraday could have perceived already ca. 1855 that the 
hypothesis was both groundless and superfluous. However, William Thomson, Lord 
Kelvin, who certainly was such a thinker, remained during the next half-century 
ether’s most adamant advocate. Considering this and other aspects of the story 
summarized above, as well as the deference that is usually —and sensibly— shown 
by philosophers and historians of science towards scientific authorities of Kelvin’s 
stature, I do not believe that a greater presence of HPS in 19th century academic 
life could have significantly speeded the abolition of ether. On the other hand, most 
historians agree that the ether hypothesis exercised a fruitful influence on research. 
From this point of view, it was perhaps just right that it survived as long as it did. 
 
 
4. “Time’s arrow”. 
 
The three foregoing sections refer to problems that I believe are no longer 
pending and in whose solution HPS had or could have had a say. That absolute 
space plays no role in Newtonian mechanics (§1) could be proved by merely 
pursuing the implications of the theory. That ‘rod contraction’ is a misnomer in SR 
(§2) can be readily understood if one bothers to ask what Einstein meant by ‘the 
length of a moving rod’ and reads his published answer to this question (see 
footnote 10). That the theory of the electromagnetic field does not have to 
postulate an ether (§3) was harder to see for 19th-century philosophers steeped in 
the mentalité chosiste of our flint carving forefathers. Although an HPS worker 
could, in principle, have reasonably abolished ether in the 1850s, it is unlikely that 
this move would have found acceptance in the philosophical or the scientific 
community. 
In this final section I shall deal with questions of time, clustering around the so-
called problem of time’s arrow. The phrase “time’s arrow” was coined by Eddington 
(1929, p. 69) presumably on the analogy of the arrows placed on street corners to 
                                                                                                                                  
predictively equivalent to Lorentz’s mature theory and were therefore experimentally 
unsuccessful. See Darrigol (2000), pp. 366-372. 
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indicate the direction of traffic. The idea that time flows (in another time?) like 
traffic along a street is of course repugnant to a philosophically trained person, but it 
is old and persistently popular. Indeed, in an otherwise beautiful line, Vergil wrote 
that “time flies away”,63 without bothering to specify the medium in which this feat 
is performed. In the abundant professional literature about time’s arrow, this 
expression does not usually refer to an attribute of time, but rather to the patterns of 
succession of natural events in time.64 The strange impression we get from watching 
a videotape —e.g. of a football game— while it is being rewound would indicate 
that common physical processes follow patterns of occurrence that normally cannot 
be reversed. From this standpoint, Eddington’s phrase might suggest that time, 
which “takes survey of all the world”, sets a direction or order to events. However, 
this is not what the philosophers and scientists who write on time’s arrow have in 
mind. In fact, some of them seem to relish the thought that time itself is unreal 
(Barbour 1999). The literature concerning time’s arrow, besides gathering and 
describing patterns of succession that appear to be irreversible, generally seeks to 
explain their irreversibility as a consequence of the universal laws of nature. Such 
attempts must overcome one major difficulty. We normally assume that the 
fundamental equations of classical, relativistic and quantum mechanics and 
electrodynamics express the universal laws of nature to an approximation that is 
sufficiently good in their respective fields of application. Those equations are 
invariant under the time reversal transformation t Å –t, which multiplies every value 
                                            
63  “Sed fugit interea, fugit inreparabile tempus” — Vergil, Georgica, 3.284. 
64  Thus, Gell-Mann and Hartle (1994), p. 311, mention: “• The thermodynamic arrow of 
time – the fact that approximately isolated systems are now almost all evolving 
towards equilibrium in the same direction of time. • The psychological arrow of time – 
we remember the past, we predict the future. • The arrow of time of retarded 
electromagnetic radiation. • The arrow of time supplied by the CP non-invariance of 
the weak interactions and the CPT invariance of field theory. • The arrow of time of 
the approximately uniform expansion of the universe. • The arrow of time supplied by 
the growth of inhomogeneity in the expanding universe.” Remarkably, they fail to 
mention the pattern of succession that most closely concerns us (and which may well 
be mainly responsible for our infallible sense of temporal orientation): we start living 
at birth and thereupon grow bigger and older until we finally die; not a single case is 
known of a person who rose from the grave and thereupon grew younger and ended by 
climbing up into his or her mother’s womb. 
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of the time variable by –1. This invariance implies that for every temporal series of 
phenomena represented by a solution of the equations there is a matching series 
represented by another equally true solution, in which the corresponding 
phenomena succeed one another in reverse order. In many cases, however, only one 
of each such pair of solutions is exemplified in the natural world. To explain this 
selectivity of nature by deriving it from time reversal invariant laws is an ambitious 
undertaking which, to say the least, is not very likely to succeed. 
Before looking more closely into this matter it will be convenient to make a few 
remarks about the meanings and uses of the word ‘time’. Since ‘time’ is a noun it is 
plausible to ask for its referent. Reading some philosophers like Kant one even gets 
the impression that in its primary use the word designates a unique entity and 
therefore ought to be regarded as a proper name (although in English we seldom 
capitalize it). Its purported denotatum turns out to be even more difficult to pin-
point than the referents of ‘Homer’ or ‘Moses’. This, in turn, lends color to the 
verdict of unreality. Of course, in everyday conversation, ‘time’ is most frequently 
employed as a common noun, to denote particular instants (“At what time shall we 
meet?”) or particular durations (“Due to the heavy traffic, it took me twice the usual 
time to get back home”), that very few people would dare to call unreal. Kant held 
that, in stark contrast with ordinary common nouns, the relation between the 
several objects called ‘times’, in the plural, and that which we call ‘time’, in the 
singular, is not that of individual instances to the class to which they belong, but 
rather that of parts to a whole. Yet, if the whole of Time remains elusive, the most 
one can grant to Kant is that, among those multiple items to which the common 
noun ‘time’ refers, some are related to each other as parts to wholes, while others —
viz., the instants— are related to the former as their boundaries.65 Something like 
this is probably what most of us would come up with when prompted to elucidate 
‘time’. However, I sense that any explication of ‘time’ that brings all its uses under 
one or two heads is surely narrow-minded. Indeed, I dare say that it is wrongheaded 
to think that ‘time’ must denote an individual object or a class of such objects 
merely because it performs like a noun. After all, only Platonists require such nouns 
as ‘beauty’ or ‘justice’ to sport substantive denotata (and not even Platonists believe 
                                            
65  Anyway, the time at which two people can sensibly agree to meet is never an instant, 
but at best a fairly short time interval, and therefore my first example may also be 
regarded as referring to a duration. 
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that the noun ‘inanity’ does it). Some continental philosophers employ the terms 
Zeitlichkeit or temporalité to elude the suggestions of definite reference implicit in 
the more familiar nouns die Zeit and le temps. Good taste bars the introduction of 
such ugly neologisms in English. On the other hand, I see no difficulty in taking 
‘time’ as a fairly abstract portmanteau term that covers (connotes) a broad variety of 
aspects of our life in the world, but does not denote anything in particular. If such is 
the case, those who, like Augustine, ask “What is time?” cannot expect a simple, 
non-contextualized, reply any more than if they asked, say, “What is excellence?” or 
“What is validity?” For our present purposes, it will be sufficient to consider four 
pervasive features of our human experience that give good reason for describing it 
as experience of time and in time. I shall summarily identify them as waiting times, 
time order, time points (or instants), and the threefold display of past, current and 
future times at each actual instant. I have deliberately included the word ‘time’ in 
all four labels to underscore its polysemy. After the first item and before the other 
three I briefly touch upon the whole of time, which is not an element or an aspect of 
our experience but has come to be permanently associated with it. 
 
(i) Waiting times: If you insist in spoiling your espresso by drinking it with sugar, 
then, as Henri Bergson shrewdly noted, you must wait for the sugar to 
dissolve in the beverage. In fact, much of our lives consist in waiting for one 
or the other thing to happen and, ultimately, of course, we always are —with 
mixed feelings—waiting for death. We spontaneously quantify waiting times, 
but our estimates are rough and highly dependent on context. However, our 
ancestors discovered that many readily typified natural processes have equal 
or proportional waiting times and began using them to measure time lengths 
intercontextually (or “objectively”, as prepostmodern philosophers are fond of 
saying). Thus, one may presume that cavemen soon realized that they had to 
wait the same time for two equally sized pots of water to boil, after placing 
them over like fires. And the people of diverse civilizations, from Stohenge to 
Tiwanaku, found out that between any two consecutive summer solstices 
they had to wait for 365 noons. With the invention and improvement of 
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clocks, the measurement of waiting times became ever handier and 
eventually took pride of place in our system of life.66 
(ii) The whole of time: Waiting times can be divided into smaller parts and 
combined into larger wholes. At sunrise I wake up waiting for the next sunset 
but also for the next noon. The selfish son of a rich man continually waits —
like everybody else— for his own death, but also, more impatiently, for that 
of his father, which he hopes will come first. Through an effortless 
idealization, we combine all waiting times into a single whole, “till Kingdom 
come”. We view finished times as getting somehow packed into Life’s attic. 
With a little imagination and a lot of abstract construction, we come to 
regard this storage place as reaching back to our birth, to the beginning of 
human history and prehistory, and even to “the creation of the world” 
(Friedmann 1922, p. 384).  
(iii) Points in time: The parts of time are marked and bounded by events. In real 
life even the slightest event —e.g. the quick utterance of a monosyllabic 
word— lasts for a while and thus fills a part of time. However, the notion of a 
point in time, which takes no time but stands between two consecutive parts 
of time, played a role in the arguments of Zeno of Elea and was carefully 
articulated by Aristotle. With the generalized use of clocks and watches this 
notion became an important ingredient of ordinary common sense. Indeed, 
to reach it one needs very little mathematical sophistication. The shadow of a 
vertical stick shrinks continually as the Sun climbs, attains its minimum 
length at noon and thereupon slowly grows again. Given these 
circumstances, it seems reasonable to conceive noon as a point in time, the 
durationless instant at which the shadow stops shrinking and begins to grow. 
(iv) Time order: Every waiting time begins, goes on and usually finishes (not 
infrequently with a disappointment). Thus, there is an inbuilt order of 
succession among its parts. This is readily extended to the whole of time, for 
whose beginning and end most of us therefore naturally —even if 
                                            
66  We now know that time measurement by clocks also depends on context, insofar as 
their accuracy is controlled by atomic clocks, which measure actual waiting times 
along their respective worldlines. Thus, if Jack remains seated on an inertially moving 
spaceship while Jill takes a roundtrip from it to ?-Centauri, Jack will wait longer than 
Jill for their reunion, according to their respective standard clocks.  
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impertinently— feel inclined to ask. Let us designate parts of time by lower 
case italics, a, b, c,…, and points in time by upper case italics A, B, C,… 
Then, for any two parts a and b, either (1) a is a part of b (a ⊂ b), or (2) b is a 
part of a (b ⊂ a), or (3) a and b share a part of time c (a ∩ b = c ≠ ∅), or (4) 
a and b do not have any part in common (a ∩ b ≠ ∅). In case (4), either a 
has already ended when b begins, in which case we say that a precedes b, or 
a begins after b has ended, in which case we say that a follows b. If a 
precedes b and b precedes c, then a precedes c. All this, I dare say, is fairly 
obvious. We have thus a linear order among non-overlapping parts of time. 
Points in time readily inherit this order if we make the following common 
though far from obvious assumption: If A and B are any two distinct points in 
time, there are always two non-overlapping parts of time a and b, such that A 
belongs to a and b belongs to B (A ∈ a ∧ B ∈ b). Under this assumption, a 
linear order is established among time points if we stipulate that, for any two 
such points A and B, A precedes B if and only if there are two non-
overlapping parts of time a and b such that A ∈ a and B ∈ b and a precedes 
b (in the sense defined above). As far as I can tell, in every case in which I 
distinguish two given points in time A and B, a third point C can be 
discerned, such that either A precedes C and C precedes B or B precedes C 
and C precedes A. This familiar experience encourages one to conceive the 
linear order of points in time as dense in itself. Modern mathematical physics 
goes a large step further and regards it as continuous, and indeed as a linear 
order on a differentiable manifold (more on this below). Only on this 
assumption can the laws of physics be expressed as differential equations 
involving the time derivatives of physical quantities. 
(v) Past, future and current time: Perhaps the most salient feature of our life in 
time is the partition of events and their times of occurrence into past, present 
and future. As far as I can judge, every normal four-year old child 
understands this partition and regularly applies it to matters of interest to him 
or her. My judgment may be biased by the fact that all the four-year olds I 
have talked to spoke either Spanish or English and had already mastered the 
use of tenses. Kant, who also spoke an Indo-European language, once noted: 
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“All predicates have as copula: is, was, will be”.67 The partition is central to 
our consciousness and our behavior and most of our decisions would hardly 
make any sense without it. Nevertheless, it has been declared illusory by 
respectable thinkers (see footnote 71). 
 
The partition of times noted under (v) is closely linked to the four acceptances 
of ‘time’ I commented under (i)-(iv). Thus, (i) one currently waits only for future 
events; to wait for the past to happen, though perhaps feasible for someone who 
adopts “the point of view from nowhen” (Price 1996), sounds crazy and even 
ungrammatical in ordinary English. Indeed our most primitive idea of a duration or 
length of time is how much we must wait now until an expected future event —e.g. 
the departure of a plane we have already boarded— becomes past. The partition 
naturally extends (ii) to points in time, and is linked (iii) to their time order, so that 
every past instant precedes all future instants. The partition provides the basic 
empirical criterion for establishing a time order among events: event A precedes 
event B if A is present or past when B is future, or A is past when B is present or 
future. Applied to (ii) the whole of time, the partition leads to the abstract 
conception of time already found in Aristotle. Using the clear and precise language 
of modern mathematics, we can say that, according to this conception, the whole of 
time is a linear continuum in which the present instant, now (tÚ nËn), effects a 
Dedekind cut. There is an obvious difficulty —a contradiction, perhaps?— in any 
statement that uses the word ‘now’ to refer to the present point in time, inasmuch as 
the word will no longer denote its original referent when the statement is finally 
completed. Some philosophers believe that this difficulty can be evaded by 
avoiding all mention of now and using instead the so-called tenseless present. A 
coordinate system is defined on the whole of time, which assigns a unique 
numerical label to each instant. The point in time when a particular event E occurs 
can then be denoted by its label: ‘E occurs at time t’, say. This approach surely has 
fostered the opinion that all times are homogeneous and that their partition into 
past, present and future is illusory. However, the tenseless present remains a mere 
figment of the intellect, devoid of reference, unless the t-labels are anchored to the 
time of our life, which, as we know too well, is structured around that partition. The 
                                            
67  “Alle praedicate haben zur copula: est, fuit, erit” (Kant, R. 4518; 1902– , 17:579). Cf. 
R. 4517: “Wir können das Wort est nicht anders als ein Zeitwort brauchen” (Kant, 
1902– , 17:579). 
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zero of time of the Christian or “common” era must be fixed at so many years, days 
and hours before now, lest it should float timelessly in nowhen.68 
Physics has created a mathematical structure that I shall denote by , to which 
it resorts for describing the evolution of phenomena and stating the laws that govern 
it.69  is a one-dimensional topological space homeomorphic with . Any bijective 
homeomorphism t:  Æ ℝ defines an unique maximal atlas A on , such that 
〈,A〉 is a one-dimensional differentiable manifold. The charts in A are known as 
time coordinate functions; “global time coordinates” if defined on all of . Every 
global time coordinate t induces on  a linear order <t such that, for any three real 
numbers a, b and c which satisfy the inequality a < b < c, either t–1(a) <t t
 –1(b) <t 
t-1(c) or t –1(c) <t t
 –1(b) <t t
 –1(a). Obviously, if t and t? are two global time 
coordinates, the orderings induced by them on  either agree or are the exact 
reverse of each other. The latter occurs, for instance, if t?(x) = –t(x) for every x ∈ . 
In this case, we may denote the mapping t? by –t or, for greater clarity, by (–t). The 
coordinate transformation (-t) ∘ t–1 is usually called time reversal, although this name 
would perhaps suit better the matching point transformation (-t)–1 ∘ t. It is worth 
noting that this point transformation is not only a automorphism of  (regarded 
both as a differentiable manifold and as a metric space), but also an isomorphism of 
orders between 〈,<t〉 and 〈,<-t〉: for any x, y ∈  such that x <t y, we have that 
(-t)–1t(x) <-t (-t)
–1t(y). By contrast, the coordinate transformation (-t) ∘ t–1 is 
certainly not an automorphism of the complete Archimedean ordered field ℝ, 
                                            
68  Sunny Auyang (1998, p. 226) trenchantly makes this same point as follows: “Without 
a proper anchoring the now, a dating system is like a calendar in science fiction. 
‘Starday 4354.27’ sounds scientific, but it floats in fantasy because it has no point of 
contact with reality. The utility of dating systems is based on their ability to 
synchronize the experiences and actions of individuals, so that each can say, ‘Today is 
March 1, 1995,’ or ‘Now it is 4 o’clock’.” I accidentally found this passage after I had 
written the text above, and I was pleasantly struck by the coincident wording. 
69  The structure , as described in the main text, is specially tailored to fit Newton’s 
“absolute, true and mathematical time” (1687, p. 5); but it also suits the universal 
time relative to an inertial frame defined by Einstein (1905, §1), as well as the mildly 
unprincipled domain of definition of the time coordinate that occurs in Schrödinger’s 
equation. However, additional qualifications and caveats may be needed to speak 
sensibly about time in the context of General Relativity, as Gordon Belot (2006) has 
aptly noted. 
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inasmuch as it maps the neutral element 1 of the multiplicative group ℝ\{0} to the 
number –1, which does not enjoy any distinguished status in the structure of ℝ. This 
difference justifies the uncommon and seemingly artificial distinction I make 
between ℝ and .70 The standard definitions of a metric and a measure on ℝ are 
readily transferred (in more than one way) to . 
The invention of  can be traced back to the founder of Greek mathematical 
astronomy, Eudoxus, and perhaps even further, to Zeno of Elea (as reported by 
Aristotle), but obviously the characterization of  in the above terms would be 
anachronistic for any epoch of science before the second half of the 19th century. 
Still, the formulation of the laws of physics as differential equations involving 
smooth functions of time, initiated by Galileo and perfected by Newton and his 
contemporaries and successors, can only make sense to us if what is meant by “time” 
—i.e. the range of the independent variable of such functions— is none other than 
 understood in these terms. In particular, such formulation is out of question unless 
“time” is a differentiable manifold. 
 affords a coherent representation of four of the five “time” features of human 
experience I listed above. By collecting them into a single structure,  justifies the 
use of a noun ‘time’, whose denotatum is any (or every) realization of , be it real or 
imaginary. Time points or instants (iv) are naturally identified with the points of the 
topological space , and waiting times (i) or durations with its open sets (or rather 
with ’s connected open sets, which constitute a basis of its topology). On this 
understanding, time order (iii) necessarily agrees with one or the other of the two 
linear orders admitted by . Thus, there is apparently no problem in equating  or 
rather its intended realization with the whole of time (ii). On the other hand, there is 
nothing whatsoever in the structure of  that even hints at a distinction between 
one particular instant and the others. Moreover, the structure of  comprises 
nothing that, given the conventional choice of a particular instant, would mark an 
important difference between the instants that precede it and those that follow it. 
Indeed —as I emphasized above when I contrasted the linear order of  with that 
of the complete Archimedean ordered field ℝ—, there are no grounds in  for 
distinguishing one of its two admissible orderings from the other. Therefore, the fifth 
                                            
70  Since physicists and philosophers do not normally bother to distinguish between  
and ℝ, the difference between a point transformation  Æ  and the corresponding 
coordinate transformation  Æ  generally eludes them. 
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item in my list, the trichotomy of times into past, present and future, though central 
to our conscious lives and crucial to our decisions, is not reflected in any way in the 
physico-mathematical representation of time. There are good reasons for this —on 
which I do not have to dwell here— and wakeful minds will not be led astray by it. 
All the same, this omission makes it a bit less surprising that men of normal or even 
superior intelligence who strongly believed in the epistemic powers of theoretical 
physics should have regarded the divide between the present, the future and the 
past as a stubborn illusion.71 
Although some writers on time’s arrow tend to identify it with the said 
trichotomy,72 these are two very different (if related) matters. ‘Time’s arrow’ or ‘the 
direction of time’ refers to the existence of a unique, or preferred, or intrinsically 
distinct time order. Obviously, anyone who, from his or her present vantage point, 
senses the blatant difference between past and future, recollection and 
expectation, times gone and times pending, can use this difference for 
distinguishing between the two possible linear orderings of the time continuum. On 
the other hand, if there is an intrinsic difference between these orderings, then the 
arbitrary choice of an instant as the zero of time determines a partition of all others 
into the two intrinsically distinct classes of instants before zero and instants after zero. 
This yields the partition of instants into past, present and future if the chosen zero is 
now. But the existence of an intrinsically distinct time order does not require or 
even imply the peculiar properties of this partition. Suppose you pick out a point p 
on a linearly ordered continuum. To establish an intrinsic difference between the 
set of points that precede and the set of points that follow p it is sufficient to find an 
intrinsically distinguished point q that belongs to one of those sets; q will 
automatically communicate its distinction to the set to which it belongs. This is what 
                                            
71  The most noteworthy among them was Albert Einstein, who wrote on 21.05.1955 to 
Michele Besso’s widow: “Für uns gläubige Physiker, hat die Scheidung zwischen 
Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft nur die Bedeutung einer wenn auch 
hartnäckigen Illusion” (quoted by Dorato 1995, p. 13). 
72  For example, Albert (2000), p. ix, describes his own “relatively straightforward 
rehearsal of what is perennially referred to in the physical literature as ‘the problem of 
the direction of time’” as a “careful discussion of what it means for a set of dynamical 
laws to distinguish, or to fail to distinguish, between the past and the future”. I beg to 
note that the very notions of past and future only make sense with regard to a present 
which no “set of dynamical laws” can mention. 
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happens with the ordered field of real numbers ℝ: the neutral element for addition 
(0) stands between two classes of real numbers; the neutral element for 
multiplication (1) confers its intrinsic distinction on the class to which it belongs 
(the positive real numbers). 
 For all practical purposes, physicists are content to use the impoverished 
structure  to set up and solve their physico-mathematical problems. When the 
time comes to apply and to test their solutions, they put in “by hand” the link to the 
present and the attendant preferred time order. Indeed, physicists do this 
spontaneously and infallibly. If, as Einstein believed, they are yielding to a delusion 
(see footnote 71), it is a pretty stable and law-abiding one. I have never heard of a 
physicist who took what is currently going on in the lab for what went on yesterday 
or who failed to distinguish the outcome of an experiment from its preparation. Most 
working physicists accept that this is how things are and leave it at that; and sensible 
philosophers should presumably do the same. However, if you happen to be a 
physicalist driven by a metaphysical itch, you will naturally expect physics to 
account for every major facet of your experience, and a feature so pervasive as the 
trichotomy of times (at each instant) —even if it is a mere illusion— cannot be an 
exception. You are then bound to find a physical ground, if not for the fleeting 
singularity of the present, then at least for the steadfast and unmistakable difference 
between the direction from past to future and that from future to past. This can be 
provided if you secure a physical foundation for distinguishing between the time 
ordering in which, at any given instant, all past times precede all future times, 
which —for ease of reference— I propose to call the forward time order, and the 
opposite time ordering in which, at any instant, all future times precede all past 
times, which I shall call the backward time order.73 There is nothing in  that can 
                                            
73  Needless to say, the words ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ function here as metaphors which 
I do not particularly relish. But they provide concise expressions that will be readily 
understood by most people today. On the other hand, an ancient Greek would have 
misunderstood them utterly, for, according to the metaphor used by Homer, at all 
times we have our eyeless backs turned toward the future, and hence we are unable to 
see it (Iliad, 3.411, 4.37, 6.352, 6.450, 15.497; Odyssey, 1.222, 2.179, 6.273, 
11.433, 14.137, 18.132, etc.; cf. Empedocles, DK 21.B.9). The standard practice of 
assigning a smaller real valued coordinate to event P and a larger one to event Q 
whenever P precedes Q in the forward time order is of course purely conventional. 
Therefore, as Price (2002, p. 88, n. 3) aptly notes, from merely examining two 
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represent such a foundation, but one may expect to find a suitable stand-in for it 
among the real-valued functions on  and other notional enrichments of the 
original structure, through which mathematical physics conceives the evolution of 
phenomena. 
In fact, the world we experience teems with readily discernible processes that 
display time-asymmetric patterns of succession (cf. the list in footnote 64). 
However, the craving for unity that was still so very much alive in the 19th century 
did not favor the dispersion of explanatory grounds over a dappled collection of 
sources, but would rather focus on a single unidirectional universal law of becoming, 
from which one would then hope to derive the entire array of temporally oriented 
patterns. Since the 1860’s, almost every philosopher-scientist who has pursued this 
question has put his or her stakes on the Second Law of Thermodynamics. As 
popularly understood, the Second Law says —or implies— that there is a physical 
property of the universe that Clausius (1865) called entropy, which takes a real 
value at each instant and increases monotonically with time.74 This, if true, is 
                                                                                                                                  
solutions of the Friedmann equations, one with a singularity at the infimum of the 
time coordinate range and another with one at its supremum, it is impossible to tell 
which one we live in.  
74  “One can express the fundamental laws of the Universe that correspond to the two 
main laws of thermodynamics in the following simple form: 1. The energy of the 
Universe is constant. 2. The entropy of the Universe tends to a maximum.” (Clausius 
1867, p. 44, as quoted in English by Uffink 2003, p. 129). Uffink notes that in his 
textbook of 1876 Clausius did not include this sweeping formulation of the Second 
Law, for which he obviously did not have a shred of evidence. Nevertheless it is 
untiringly repeated, often with great fanfare, in the philosophical literature, e.g. by 
Albert (2000, p. 32): “The third and final and most powerful and most illuminating of 
the formulations of the second law of thermodynamics […] is that ‘the total entropy of 
the world (or of any isolated subsystem of the world), in the course of any possible 
transformation, either keeps the same value or goes up’.” Indeed Brush (1976, p. 579), 
who says that the statement about cosmic entropy was eliminated in the third edition 
of Clausius’s treatise (1887), mentions this fact with a tinge of regret. More recently, 
Price (2002, p. 88-89) has suggested that “we could do without the notion of entropy 
altogether” and “hence by-pass a century of discussions about how it should be 
defined”, or perhaps use the term ‘entropy’ only as a portmanteau word for “a long list 
of the actual kinds of physical phenomena which exhibit a temporal preference, which 
occur in nature with one temporal orientation but not the other”. 
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sufficient physical ground for distinguishing permanently and globally a definite 
direction on . However, in the 1850’s the conception of heat as a kind of motion75 
had finally prevailed over the notion that heat is a peculiar substance. By accepting 
that conception, physicists placed themselves under an obligation to provide a 
mechanical explanation of thermal phenomena, and in particular to derive the 
time-asymmetric Second Law from the time-reversal invariant laws of mechanics. 
This, in a nutshell, is the problem of time’s arrow. A child or an Andean peasant 
who understood its terms would promptly conclude that it is insoluble.76 But 
European adults are a stubborn breed, and some of them, from Ludwig Boltzmann 
on, have spent untold hours trying to figure out a solution. 
Criticism of Boltzmann was promptly voiced by Loschmidt (1876), clarified by 
Burbury (1894) and backed —with a different argument— by Zermelo (1896a, 
1896b). Their mathematical strictures eventually compelled Boltzmann to assign a 
regional scope (restricted both in space and time!) to the direction of time resulting 
from the evolution of entropy. Philosophers have been surprisingly complacent 
about this curious view, which they have sought to bolster with schemes of their 
own making.77 On the other hand, it is only very recently that HFS research, mainly 
                                            
75  This phrase “the kind of motion we call heat” was introduced by Clausius in the title 
of one of his great papers on the subject (1857). In our days, Stephen G. Brush used it 
in the title of his monumental history of the kinetic theory of heat (1976). 
76  Cf. Henri Poincaré (1893), p. 537: “Il n’est pas besoin d’un long examen pour se défier 
d’un raisonnement où […] l’on trouve en effet la réversibilité dans les prémisses et 
l’irréversibilité dans la conclusion.” 
77  Here is a small sample of texts from Reichenbach (1956, pp. 127-128, my italics): 
“The total entropy of the world in its present state is not too high: the universe has 
large reserves in ordered states, so to speak, which it spends in the creation of branch 
systems and thus applies to provide us with a direction of time. […] It follows that we 
cannot speak of a direction for time as a whole; only certain sections of time have 
directions, and these directions are not the same. […] Boltzmann has made it very clear 
that the alternation of time directions represents no absurdity. He refers our time 
direction to that section of the entropy curve on which we are living. If it should 
happen that ‘later’ the universe, after reaching a high-entropy state and staying in it 
for a long time, enters into a long downgrade of the entropy curve, then, for this 
section, time would have the opposite direction: human beings that might live during 
this section would regard as positive time the transition to higher entropy, and thus 
their time would flow in a direction opposite to ours. […] Life is restricted to the 
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by Uffink (2001, 2003; see also Brown and Uffink 2001; Callender 2001) has 
made it clear to philosophers that the thermodynamic concept of entropy can only 
be defined for particular physical systems under special conditions. This is sufficient 
to dismiss the popular understanding of the Second Law of Thermodynamics as a 
law of cosmic evolution, to disqualify thermodynamic entropy as the physical source 
of universal time order, and to remove the need for deriving Time’s Arrow —per 
impossibile— from the mechanical or statistico-mechanical principles of thermal 
physics. I cannot give here a detailed and accurate picture of this complex affair, 
but the following sketch should be sufficient for my present purpose (and will, I 
hope, provoke a desire to read more about it in the references I give). 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics can be traced back to Sadi Carnot’s 
groundbreaking thoughts about heat engines (1824). A heat engine is a device by 
which heat is transferred from a hot reservoir —the furnace (foyer)— to a cooler one 
—the refrigerator (réfrigerant)— and which through this process yields mechanical 
work. According to the caloric theory of heat, which Carnot took for granted, heat is 
an indestructible substance, so that, if the process is carried out adiabatically, that is, 
in thermal isolation from the rest of the world, the amount of heat drawn from the 
furnace must be equal to the amount surrendered to the refrigerator. But Carnot’s 
reasoning does not depend on this,78 but on the assumption that the endless 
production of mechanical work (création indéfinie de puissance motrice), without 
consuming heat or any other agent whatsoever, is impossible (Carnot 1824, p. 21). 
From this assumption, he proved that a periodically operating heat engine which in 
each full cycle C performs an amount of work W(C) by transferring heat Q(C) from 
                                                                                                                                  
temperate zones of transition in the entropy curve. Thus an alternation of time 
directions would involve no contradiction to experiences accessible to us. Perhaps we 
are, indeed, inhabitants of a second section, in which the entropy ‘really’ goes down, without 
our knowing it.” 
78  Carnot must have had grave doubts about the caloric theory, for his book contains the 
following rhetorical question: “Can one conceive the phenomena of heat and 
electricity as due to anything else than the motions of bodies? As such, must they not 
be subject to the general laws of mechanics?” (Carnot 1824, p. 21n; cf. p. 37n). In 
fact, the conservation of heat is incompatible with Carnot’s proof, as Joule showed to 
Kelvin (in a letter of 8 October 1848, quoted by Crosbie Smith 1998, p. 83; the 
argument is also given in Maxwell 1883, pp. 146f. and reproduced in Torretti 1999a, 
p. 187 n. 56). 
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a furnace at temperature ?+ to a refrigerator at temperature ?- has an efficiency 
W(C)/Q(C) equal to or less than a maximum C(?+,?-), and that the value of 
C(?+,?-) does not depend on the nature of the means employed but “is fixed solely 
by the temperatures of the bodies between which the transfer of heat ultimately 
occurs” (p. 38). Moreover, the maximum efficiency C(?+,?-) can only be attained if 
the bodies involved in the process of producing work by heat transfer do not 
undergo “any change of temperature which is not due to a change in volume” (p. 
23). Such changes can only be effected by outside intervention on an adiabatically 
closed system (e.g. by moving a piston very slowly). Carnot’s results were applied 
with great success in the design of steam engines. 
When the caloric theory was finally given up around 1850, the amount of work 
W was equated with the difference Q+(C) – Q-(C) between the heat extracted 
from the furnace and the heat surrendered to the refrigerator. In the new context 
the efficiency is defined as W(C)/Q+(C). Rudolf Clausius and William Thomson 
(later Lord Kelvin) derived Carnot’s theorem (thus understood) from two 
differently stated “axioms”, which I quote in Thomson’s wording (1851; in 1882, 
pp. 179, 181): 
THOMSON: It is impossible, by means of inanimate material agency, to derive 
mechanical effect from any portion of matter by cooling it below the temperature 
of the coldest of the surrounding objects. 
CLAUSIUS: It is impossible for a self-acting machine, unaided by any external 
agency to, to convey heat from one body to another at a higher temperature. 
Thomson notes that, although these axioms “are different in form, either is a 
consequence of the other”. They became known as the Second Law —or 
Principle— of Thermodynamics (energy conservation being the First).79 Their 
empirical warrant is the thermal phenomena that corroborate Carnot’s theorem. 
                                            
79  According to Thomson (1851) “the whole theory of the motive power of heat is 
founded on the two following propositions”, viz. , “PROP. I. (Joule)”, which amounts to 
energy conservation, and “PROP. II. (Carnot and Clausius).—If an engine be such that, 
when it is worked backwards, the physical and mechanical agencies in every part of its 
motions are all reversed, it produces as much mechanical effect as can be produced by 
any thermodynamic engine, with the same temperatures of source and refrigerator, 
from a given quantity of heat” (1882, p. 178). Prop. II is then derived from the 
Thomson axiom quoted above, for which he argues thus: “If this axiom be denied for 
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In a series of papers, Clausius and Kelvin extended and reformulated the 
result. In 1854 Kelvin showed that the absolute temperature scale T(?) can 
be chosen such that C(T+,T -) = J(1 – T+/T -) [where J is Joule’s constant], or 
equivalently 
 
Q +(C)
T +
=
Q ?(C)
T ?
 
Generalizing the approach to cycles involving an arbitrary number of heat 
reservoirs, they obtained the formulation: 
 
dQ
TC? = 0  if C is reversible
80 (10) 
and 
 
dQ
TC? ? 0  if C is not reversible (11) 
Note that here T stands for the absolute temperature of the heat reservoirs; it 
is only in the case of (10) that T can be equated with the temperature of the 
system. 
(Uffink 2003, pp. 126-127) 
 
Since the integral 
 
dQ
TC? = 0  whenever the body, evolving from an initial state A0 
through any series of other states, returns to A0, the integrand “must be the total 
differential of a quantity that depends solely on the present state of the body and 
not on the way by which it has reached that state” (Clausius 1865, §14). Clausius 
designates this quantity by S and calls it ‘entropy’ (Entropie, “from the Greek word 
                                                                                                                                  
all temperatures, it would have to be admitted that a self-acting machine might be set 
to work and produce mechanical effect by cooling the sea or earth, with no limit but 
the total loss of heat from the earth and sea, or, in reality, from the whole material 
world” (1882, p. 179n.) 
80  I have renumbered the equations in Uffink’s text. The symbol d indicates that dQ 
might not be an exact differential. ‘Reversible’ here translates ‘umkehrbar’, as defined 
by Clausius (1864, p. 251): a process is reversible if it proceeds so slowly that the 
system always remain close to equilibrium; see Uffink 2001, p. 384. (Clausius’ text is 
given by Uffink on p. 335.)  
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tropÆ, transformation”—ibid.). Therefore, we have that 
 
 
 
dS =
dQ
T
 (12) 
  
or, if we suppose that this equation is integrated for a series of reversible 
transformations, through which the body passes from the initial state to its 
present state, and if we denote by S0 the value of S for the present state, then 
 
 S =S
0
+
dQ
T
?  (13) 
(Clausius 1865, §14) 
 
The Second Law can then be restated as saying (i) that the entropy of a heat 
engine operating under conditions of maximal efficiency remains constant in each 
cycle and (ii) that if the engine works under any other conditions its entropy 
necessarily increases.81 However, to speak of “the entropy of the universe” as 
Clausius went on to do right away (see footnote 74) is only an exercise in fanciful 
Naturphilosophie. Not only did Clausius lack any empirical warrant for his cosmic 
version of the law. The very science of thermodynamics was wholly focused on small 
thermally isolated bodies whose volume and shape can be altered adiabatically by 
outside intervention, and the concept of temperature and the related concept of 
entropy were defined only for systems in a state of equilibrium which cannot be 
seriously ascribed to the universe as we know it. The rigorous formulation of 
thermodynamics, pioneered by Gibbs (1876), carried out by Carathéodory (1909) 
and recently perfected by Lieb and Yngvason (1999) has made the Second Law 
“independent of models […], Carnot cycles, ideal gases and other assumptions 
about such things as heat, temperature, reversible processes, etc.” (Lieb and 
Yngvason 2003, p. 147), but still defines “the additive and extensive entropy 
function S” only for equilibrium states.82  
                                            
81  Uffink (2003, p. 127) recalls, however, that Kelvin never mentions the inequality (11) 
from which (ii) follows, and indeed calls eqn. (10) “the full expression of the second 
thermodynamic law”. 
82  More significantly, perhaps, for the present discussion: the rigorous treatment of 
thermodynamics excludes very small and very large material systems from its scope. 
“Physically speaking a thermodynamic system consists of certain specified amounts of 
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Although Clausius and Kelvin embraced the conception of heat as a kind of 
motion, initially they did not agree on what kind of motion it was. While Kelvin was 
inclined throughout his life to view matter as being ultimately continuous,83 
Clausius (1857) sought to derive the thermal behavior of gases from the hypothesis 
that a gas consists of “molecules”, conceived as very small, perfectly elastic spheres 
that move freely, without interacting among themselves.84 Clausius (1858) rectified 
the latter highly unrealistic assumption by making allowance for intermolecular 
collisions, and calculated the mean free path of each molecule. The molecular-
kinetic theory of heat took a big stride forward in a paper read in September 1859 
to the British Association by 28-year old James Clerk Maxwell (1860). By boldly 
resorting to considerations of probability (which Clausius had timidly broached) in 
the discussion of velocity changes in molecular collisions, Maxwell derived “the Final 
Distribution of Velocity among the Molecules of Two Systems acting on one 
another by any Law of Force” (Maxwell 1866; in Maxwell 1890, 2: 43). This was 
subsequently modified by Ludwig Boltzmann (1868) and is therefore known as the 
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution law. Maxwell and Boltzmann became thus the 
founding fathers of classical statistical mechanics.85  
                                                                                                                                  
different kinds of matter; it might be divisible into parts that can interact with each 
other in a specified way. […]. Our systems must be macroscopic, i.e, not too small. 
Tiny systems (atoms, molecules, DNA) exist, to be sure, but we cannot describe their 
equilibria thermodynamically […]. On the other hand, systems that are too large are 
also ruled out because gravitational forces become important. […] The conventional 
notions of ‘extensivity’ and ‘intensivity’ fail for cosmic bodies.” (Lieb and Yngvason 
1999, p. 13; my italics). 
83  In the Baltimore lectures of 1884, while presenting a model of an elastic solid built 
from bell cranks and springs, Kelvin asserts emphatically: “The molecular constitution 
of solids supposed in these remarks and mechanically illustrated in our model is not to 
be accepted as true in nature” (Kargon and Achinstein 1987, p. 110). 
84  Clausius says that he was inspired by Krönig (1856), whose molecular-kinetic 
explanation of thermal behavior assumed however that each molecule in his model 
moved in a direction perpendicular to one of the walls of a cubic container. The 
molecular theory of gases can be traced back to Daniel Bernoulli (1738, §10). Versions 
of it were put forward by Herapath (1821) and Waterston (1846), but met a generally 
cold reception. See Brush (1976).  
85  Boltzmann’s contribution is eloquently described by Uffink (2006, §4), where one will 
also find abundant references for further study. See also Uffink 2004 
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In the next few decades, Boltzmann vigorously pursued the “reduction” of 
thermal physics to classical mechanics.86 As a part of this program, he introduced a 
generalized concept of entropy, which is also applicable outside states of 
equilibrium, and which allegedly supplied a statistico-mechanical foundation for 
time’s arrow. The new concept turned up in connection with Boltzmann’s proof 
that any gas, “whatever may be the initial distribution of kinetic energy” among its 
molecules, must in the long run approach the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution and, 
once it is reached, keep it for ever. Despite the ambitious generality of the phrase I 
have quoted from Boltzmann (1872, in Brush 2003, p. 291),87 his argument 
actually depends on several restrictive assumptions. Some of these are eventually 
relaxed or are at least declared relaxable, but others remain in place and determine 
the scope both of the said proof and of the ensuing demonstration that the 
(generalized) entropy of the gas continually increases until the gas acquires the 
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, and is constant thereafter. The following 
inescapable conditions are explicitly mentioned by Boltzmann: 
 
(i) The gas consists of a large but finite number of molecules insulated and 
confined by rigid walls in a large but finite space R. 
(ii) The molecules interact according to an unspecified law of force, which is 
however the same for all, it being assumed that “that the force between two 
material points is a function of their distance, which acts in the direction of 
their line of centers, and that action and reaction are equal” (1872, in Brush 
2003, p. 279). 
                                            
86  I surround ‘reduction’ with shudder quotes because, contrary to many philosophers of 
my generation, I feel no sympathy for the idea of deriving the fullness of experience 
from dreams of reason. The obstacles met (and not overcome) by Boltzmann and his 
successors in their attempted reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics 
are discussed with great acuity by Sklar (1993), Ch. 9, especially pp. 345-373. Sklar 
concludes equanimously (yet, I suppose, not without irony): “If we wish to claim that 
thermodynamics is reducible to statistical mechanics, we must have a subtly contrived 
model of reduction in mind.” 
87  As translated by Brush. Boltzmann’s conclusion reads thus in German: “Es ist somit 
strenge bewiesen, daß, wie immer die Verteilung der lebendigen Kraft zu Anfang der Zeit 
gewesen sein mag, sie sich nach Verlauf einer sehr langen Zeit immer notwendig der von 
Maxwell gefundenen nähern muß” (Boltzmann 1909, 1:345; I italicize the phrase in 
question). 
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(iii) Interaction occurs only when the interacting molecules are very close and is 
therefore called “collision” by Boltzmann. Most of the time, however, the 
molecules move freely, i.e. with constant velocities along straight lines. 
(iv) The probability that any particular molecule initially moves in a particular 
direction is the same as the probability that it moves in any other direction. 
(This can be formulated more precisely thus: let x denote the initial position 
of an arbitrary molecule; then, the probability that the unit vector x x  lies 
inside a particular solid angle ? with its vertex at x is proportional to the size 
of ?). 
(v) The initial distribution of kinetic energies among the molecules is uniform on 
R. The exact meaning of this condition is explained by Boltzmann as follows: 
pick a connected space r ⊂ R of any shape and unit volume; let ƒ(x,t) 
denote the number of molecules in r whose kinetic energy at time t is any 
real number in the interval (x,x+dx); then, the distribution ƒ is said to be 
uniform on R at time t if, for every real number x, the number ƒ(x,t) does not 
depend on the shape or the location of the unit volume space r ⊂ R.88 
 
Uffink (2006, p. 45) mentions two additional assumptions that Boltzmann does not 
state but which he uses in his proof: 
 
(vi) The distribution ƒ is represented by a differentiable function, which 
Boltzmann also designates by ƒ (without further ado); the number of 
molecules in R must therefore be large enough for this approximation to be 
viable. 
(vii) ƒ is allowed to vary only as a result of binary interactions; therefore the 
density of the gas must be low enough for n-particle collisions (n > 2) to be 
extremely rare. On the other hand, it cannot be so low that even 2-particle 
collisions are too infrequent for ƒ to change. 
 
According to Boltzmann “it is clear” that conditions (iv) and (v) will continue to 
hold forever, if they hold initially. I confess that I do not find this self-evident. I 
therefore tend to agree with Uffink when he lists the persistence in time of 
conditions (iv)-(vii) as a third unstated assumption (2006, p. 45). Boltzmann 
                                            
88  Condition (v) is tantamount to what Boltzmann (1964), pp. 40-41, describes as a 
state of molecular disorder. 
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argues that if conditions (iv) and (v) are not met initially, they will be satisfied “after 
a very long time”, for then “each direction for the velocity of a molecule is equally 
probable” (1872, in Brush 2003, p. 267) and “each position in the gas is 
equivalent” (ibid., p. 268). Apparently, he thinks that one may in every case regard 
such “very long time” as already elapsed before whatever instant is the initial one in 
that case. 
From these essential assumptions, plus a few other inessential ones,89 Boltzmann 
is able to derive a differential equation for the distribution function ƒ(x,t), on whose 
left-hand side stands the partial derivative 
?ƒ(x,t)
?t
 and whose right-hand side sports 
a double integral. This differential equation is known as the Boltzmann transport 
equation. For brevity’s sake, I shall denote ƒ(x,t) by ƒMB(x,t) if ƒ(x,t) corresponds to 
the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. It can be easily shown that 
?ƒ
MB
(x,t)
?t
= 0 . 
Thus, after the distribution ƒMB is reached, it will never change. 
By deft manipulation of his transport equation, Boltzmann (1872) proved that 
the quantity 
 
                                            
89  The provisional assumptions that Boltzmann invokes in his detailed proof (1872, § I), 
but which he later removes or pronounces removable, include the following: 
(viii) All molecules in R are monoatomic and equal to one another. In § IV, 
Boltzmann extends his results to a gas consisting of polyatomic molecules of 
the same kind, “i.e. they all consist of the same number of mass-points, and 
the forces acting between them are identical functions of their relative 
positions” (1872, in Brush 2003, p. 318), the mass-points or atoms being held 
together by a force that depends only on their mutual distance and acts along 
the line that joins them. Then, towards the end of § IV, he observes that his 
calculation of entropy for such a polyatomic gas “can be carried out in the 
same way if several kinds of molecules are present in the same container” 
(1872, in Brush 2003, p. 334); in this case, the total entropy of the system is 
equal to the sum of the entropies computed for each subsystem formed by 
molecules of the same kind. 
(ix) The wall of the container that encloses the gas reflects the molecules like 
elastic spheres. Boltzmann adds: “Any arbitrary force law would lead to the 
same formulae. However, it simplifies the matter if we make this special 
assumption about the container” (1872, in Brush 2003, p. 267). 
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 H = ƒ(x,t) log
ƒ(x,t)
x
?
?
?
?
?
??1
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
??0
?
? dx  (14)90 
  
“can never increase, when the function ƒ(x,t) that occurs in the definite integral 
satisfies” the Boltzmann equation (1872, in Brush 2003, p. 281). This is 
Boltzmann’s famous (some might say “notorious”) H-theorem. By virtue of it, the 
function H defined as in eqn. (14) in terms of any solution ƒ of the Boltzmann 
equation satisfies the inequality 
 
 
dH
dt
? 0  (15) 
 
with equality holding if and only if ƒ = ƒMB. The latter is, of course, the equilibrium 
case, for which alone thermodynamic entropy is defined. Boltzmann noted that 
precisely in this case, H is proportional to the entropy. He therefore introduced a 
generalized concept of entropy, which is related with H by the same proportionality 
factor in the non-equilibrium cases, where thermodynamic entropy is not defined. 
Eqn. (15) entails then that the (generalized) entropy of any system to which it is 
applicable will increase while the distribution ƒ differs from ƒMB and therefore tends 
to become equal to ƒMB, and that it will reach a maximum and henceforth remain 
unchanged as soon as ƒ = ƒMB. (Note that the factor of proportionality between H 
and the generalized entropy is such that the latter reaches its maximum when H 
attains its minimum). 
A glance at conditions (i)-(vii) is sufficient to persuade one that a proof based 
on them cannot lead to conclusions about the universe. Indeed, condition (i) alone 
should dispel any such illusion. But even if we manage to forget it —as so many 
writers on time’s arrow have been able to do— we must still face condition (v), 
which, as Boltzmann (1964, p. 41) emphasizes, not only “is necessary to the rigor of 
the proof” but must be assumed in all applications of Boltzmann’s equation. No 
region of the universe that contains, say, a star and a sizable chunk of interstellar 
space around it complies with condition (v). It may well be that “after a very long 
time” all such regions and the universe as a whole will meet this condition of 
uniformity, but it would be utterly reckless to assume, for the sake of the argument, 
                                            
90  Boltzmann (1872) denoted this quantity by E. The now standard designation H was 
introduced by Burbury (1890) and adopted by Boltzmann. 
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that this “very long time” has elapsed already. Nevertheless, in the subsequent, at 
times passionate debate about the validity and meaning of the H-theorem, the 
major participants generally remained silent about the restrictions that Boltzmann’s 
premises imposed on his conclusions. It was as if a goblin hidden in their minds had 
made them deaf and blind to anything that might threaten the satisfaction of their 
yen for global truth. 
The two main objections to Boltzmann’s H-Theorem are the reversibility 
objection, soon raised by Joseph Loschmidt (1876),91 and the recurrence objection, 
due to Ernst Zermelo (1896a, 1896b).92 I shall only discuss the former, which can 
be explained as follows. Consider an isolated, finite classical mechanical system 
consisting of N point-particles that meet the assumptions of Boltzmann’s proof. The 
system’s dynamical state ?0 (at initial time ? = 0) is fully characterized by 3N 
position coordinates q1(0),…, q3N(0) and 3N momentum coordinates p1(0),…, 
p3N(0). If the distribution ƒ(0) differs from ƒMB, then, according to the H-theorem, 
the value of H for this system must decrease to a minimum Hmin which it reaches 
when ƒ = ƒMB and must remain constant thereafter. Suppose this happens at time 
? = t. The laws of mechanics determine exactly the position and momentum 
                                            
91  According to von Plato (1994), p. 85, Loschmidt’s objection had already been stated 
by William Thomson (1874). However, all I can find in Thomson’s text (as reproduced 
in Brush 2003, p. 351) is a clear statement of the solid ground on which the objection 
rests, viz. the time reversal invariance of the laws of “abstract dynamics” (Thomson’s 
phrase), but I do not find an argument contra Boltzmann. 
92  Zermelo’s recurrence objection rests on a theorem by Poincaré (1890), which can be 
stated as follows: In a system of mass-points under the influence of forces that depend only on 
position in space, any state of motion must recur infinitely many times, at least to any 
arbitrary degree of approximation, if the position and momentum coordinates cannot increase 
to infinity (Zermelo 1896a, in Brush 2003, pp. 382-383). Since H depends on the 
distribution ƒ, which in turn depends on the momentum coordinates, Zermelo argued 
that H must therefore return infinitely many times to its initial value, contrary to the 
original Boltzmann claim that H decreases steadily until it reaches a minimum which 
it retains. According to Mackey (1992, p. 45). “Zermelo was right in his assertion that 
the entropy of a system whose dynamics are governed by Hamilton’s equations, or any 
set of ordinary differential equations for that matter, cannot change”, but was wrong 
to base his argument on Poincaré’s theorem, Zermelo’s fallacy lying on “his implicit 
assumption that densities (on which the behavior of entropy depnds) will behave like 
points”. 
Philosophical criticism and the advancement of science 62 
coordinates q1(t),…, q3N(t), p1(t),…, p3N(t) that characterize the state ?t of the 
system at that time. Consider now a system whose state ?0? at ? = 0 is characterized 
by the coordinates qi?(0) = qi(t), pi?(0) = –pi(t) (1 ? i ? 3N). According to the laws of 
mechanics the evolution of this system from ? = 0 to ? = t is exactly the reverse of 
that of the system we considered first. Therefore, its state ?t? at ? = t will be given by 
qi?(t) = qi(0), pi?(t) = –pi(0) (1 ? i ? 3N). Clearly, for this system, the distribution 
ƒ?(0) = ƒMB and the initial value of H = Hmin, whereas the distribution ƒ?(t) ? ƒMB 
and the final value of H will exceed its initial value. Thus, if the H-theorem holds 
for our first system, then it does not hold for the second one, although this is a bona 
fide classical system that satisfies the theorem’s assumptions. Therefore, if P stands 
for “The H-theorem is true of any system that meets conditions (i)-(vii)”, then, by 
the familiar tautology (P ? ¬P) ? ¬P, statement P is plainly false. 
Boltzmann must have been cut to the quick by Loschmidt’s objection for, 
although he explained it faithfully and clearly and, in the end, essentially granted it, 
he described it as “an interesting sophism” and set out, without more ado, “to locate 
the source of the fallacy in this argument” (1877a, in Brush 2003, p. 365). 
However, Boltzmann’s line of defense depends entirely on the fact, apparently 
overlooked by Loschmidt, that some of the premises from which the H-theorem is 
proved are statements of probability. As a consequence of this fact, the H-theorem 
cannot be regarded as a universal law of nature, but only as an overwhelmingly 
probable statistical generalization. Thus, Boltzmann does not actually disclose a 
fallacy at the heart of Loschmidt’s argument, but rather a colossal 
misunderstanding, for which Boltzmann himself was partly to blame, since he had 
not sufficiently emphasized the unorthodox meaning and reach of molecular-
kinetic statements in his former publications.93 To elucidate it, one usually 
distinguishes between the microstates and the macrostates of a mechanical system 
of N particles. The microstate of the system at time t is identified by the exact values 
of the 6N coordinates pi(t), qi(t) (1 ? i ? 3N). The set of all such 6N-tuples fills the 
                                            
93  Jan von Plato (1994), p. 79, believes that “Boltzmann had by 1872 already a full hand 
against his future critics”, for he was sufficiently explicit about the statistical nature of 
his premises and conclusions. For a more balanced judgment concerning Boltzmann’s 
position before and after 1876, see Uffink (2006), §4.2. No matter when Boltzmann 
got his full house, what Loschmidt could show against it looks to me like a straight 
flush. 
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system’s phase space S ? ℝ6N. A macrostate of the system is an open set M ? S 
formed by microstates that share the values of certain physical quantities one may 
plausibly regard as macroscopic observables. Evidently, if N is the number of 
molecules in a mere cubic meter of gas (at normal pressure and temperature), it is 
absolutely impracticable to identify the microstate of our system. Therefore, 
molecular-kinetic theory cannot predict the evolution of microstates according to 
the laws of mechanics, but must rely on statistical reasoning concerning the 
macrostates. To get started, this kind of reasoning requires the definition of a 
probability measure μ on the phase space.94 Boltzmann assumes that every 
conceivable microstate 〈q1,…,q3N,p1,…,p3N〉 ∈ S is equally probable; judging by his 
reasoning, it appears that he took this to mean that μ is uniformly distributed over S. 
Hence, for any open set M ? S, μ(M) is proportional to the Euclidean volume of M. 
There are, of course, no a priori grounds for this assumption, but it can somehow be 
justified a posteriori by the predictive success of inferences based on it. If MMB ? S is 
the set of microstates characterized by the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution ƒMB, it is 
easy to show that μ(MMB) is very large, indeed very much larger than the measure of 
any other macrostate M ? S. Therefore, according to Boltzmann, if our system is 
initially in a macrostate MI for which the distribution ƒ ? ƒMB, then almost every 
microstate in MI must eventually evolve into a microstate belonging to MMB. This 
evolution will take more or less time depending on the microstate, but while the 
evolution lasts the function H will steadily decrease until it reaches its minimum 
Hmin, as ƒ becomes equal to ƒMB. Prompted by Loschmidt’s challenge, Boltzmann 
wrote a classical paper “On the relation between the second principle of the 
mechanical theory of heat and the probability calculus with respect to the theorems 
concerning thermal equilibrium” (1877b), followed by “Further remarks on some 
problems of the mechanical theory of heat” (1878), where he gave the definition of 
the entropy S of a system in terms of the probability W of its mechanical state which 
is carved on Boltzmann’s tombstone: S = k log W. 
From the overwhelming value of μ(MMB) Boltzmann infers that it is enormously 
likely that a point in a low probability macrostate is the starting point of an evolution 
leading to a microstate in MMB. His inference rests on the notion that the length of 
                                            
94  Since measure theory and the measure-theoretic approach to probability were still 
unborn in the 1870’s, my manner of speaking here is surely anachronistic. 
Nevertheless, I expect it to be helpful. 
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time that a mechanical system spends in a macrostate M is proportional to its 
probability μ(M). Fortunately, the present discussion does not require that we go 
into the foundations and difficulties of this notion.95 We can simply accept it and 
yet conclude that Boltzmann’s defense is powerless against Loschmidt’s objection. 
For ease of reference, I introduce a few symbols. I shall write (i) M0 for the particular 
non-equilibrium macrostate I choose for consideration, (ii) 
 
M0,t
?MB  for the proper 
subset of M0 formed by the starting points of phase space trajectories that leave M0 
at time ? = 0 and reach MMB at time ? = t; and (iii) MMB
?0,t  for the set of points at 
which the phase trajectories initiated in M0,t
?MB  reach MMB. I shall denote by R both 
(iv) the transformation of the phase space S ? ℝ6n defined by 〈q1,…,q3N,p1,…,p3N〉 
Å 〈q1,…,q3N,-p1,…,-p3N〉 and (v) the mapping induced by this transformation in the 
power set ?S. The use of the same symbol for designating two such mappings is of 
course standard; however, to avoid needless confusion, I write, as usual, R(x) for the 
value of mapping (iv) at a microstate x ∈ S, but I write RM for the value of (v) at a 
set M ⊂ S. Consider in particular the set RMMB
?0,t . This set is obtained by reversing 
—à la Loschmidt— the velocity of each particle in each microstate comprised in 
 MMB
?0,t . According to the laws of mechanics, the trajectories initiated in  RMMB
?0,t  
inexorably lead in a time interval of length t to states belonging to the non 
equilibrium macrostate RM0. During that time the function H increases steadily 
above Hmin. By a well-known theorem named after Liouville, μ( MMB
?0,t ) = μ( M0,t
?MB ) 
? ?(M0) << μ(MMB). The mapping R:?S Æ ?S preserves the measure ?. Therefore 
μ( RMMB
?0,t ) = μ( MMB
?0,t ) = μ( M0,t
?MB ). Thus, the probability that our mechanical 
system will evolve in time t from an equilibrium state in which H = Hmin toward a 
                                            
95  In his earlier writings on the subject, Boltzmann apparently based the idea that the 
length of time spent by the system in a macrostate is proportional to the probability of 
this macrostate on the so-called ergodic hypothesis, according to which the trajectory 
of the system in phase space passes through every point of the hypersurface 
corresponding to the system’s energy. Since this is mathematically impossible —as 
Rosenthal (1913) and Plancherel (1913) independently proved— it has been 
suggested (already by Paul and Tatiana Ehrenfest in 1912) that Boltzmann was 
actually thinking of the quasi-ergodic hypothesis, by which the system comes as close 
as you wish to every point of the energy hypersurface. This is not impossible, but it 
does not yield the desired consequences regarding the probability distribution. See 
Uffink 2006, §4.1. 
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non-equilibrium state in which H > Hmin is not a whit smaller than the probability 
that it will evolve in time t from the particular non-equilibrium macrostate MI to the 
equilibrium state MMB, while H shrinks to Hmin. If Boltzmann’s statistical reasoning is 
valid, it proves (a) that H = Hmin for overwhelmingly long periods of time and (b) 
that, when H > Hmin, H tends with overwhelmingly great probability to return to its 
minimum value. Nevertheless, the time reversal invariance of the laws of mechanics 
makes the following conclusion inevitable: the probability of evolutions that lead in 
any given time t from an (admittedly improbable) non-equilibrium macrostate M0 
to equilibrium, as H decreases, is precisely equal to the probability of evolutions that 
lead in time t from a (likewise improbable) subset of the equilibrium macrostate 
MMB to the non-equilibrium macrostate RM0, while H increases. Boltzmann’s 
appeal to statistics and probability does not rescue the H-theorem from Loschmidt’s 
attack. 
Boltzmann in effect granted this when he brought up, towards the end of his 
reply to Loschmidt, 
a peculiar consequence of Loschmidt’s theorem, namely that when we 
follow the state of the world into the infinitely distant past, we are actually 
just as correct in taking it to be very probable that we would reach a state in 
which all temperature differences have disappeared, as we would be in 
following the state of the world into the distant future. 
(Boltzmann 1877a; in Brush 2003, p. 367) 
 
This amazing result was reasserted by Boltzmann in his later writings and became 
entrenched in the philosophical literature of the 20th century (see Reichenbach, 
1956; Grünbaum 1973). I can only regard it as a piece of intellectual bravado, for 
which Boltzmann could not claim the faintest empirical support.96 He probably 
                                            
96  A few lines further on Boltzmann adds: “Perhaps this reduction of the second law to 
the realm of probability makes its application to the entire universe appear dubious”. 
This apparent concession to ordinary intelligence is countered at once by the following 
remark: “Yet the laws of probability theory are confirmed by all experiments carried 
out in the laboratory” (1877a; in Brush 2003, p. 367). This is true, but then to extend 
these laws from the lab to the entire universe one would have to define a statistical 
ensemble of which the universe itself is an instance, and, as far as I can see, any 
attempt to do so cannot fail to be arbitrary. 
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thought that none would ever be forthcoming, for he dared to offer the following 
explanation of the ostensible time-directedness of thermal phenomena: 
 
One can think of the world as a mechanical system of an enormously large 
number of constituents, and of an immensely long period of time, so that the 
dimensions of that part containing our own “fixed stars” are minute 
compared to the extension of the universe; and times that we call eons are 
likewise minute compared to such a period. Then in the universe, which is in 
thermal equilibrium throughout and therefore dead, there will occur here 
and there relatively small regions of the same size as our galaxy (we call them 
single worlds) which, during the relative short time of eons, fluctuate 
noticeably from thermal equilibrium, and indeed the state probability in 
such cases will be equally likely to increase or decrease. For the universe, the 
two directions of time are indistinguishable, just as in space there is no up or 
down. However, just as at a particular place on the earth's surface we call 
“down” the direction toward the center of the earth, so will a living being in a 
particular time interval of such a single world distinguish the direction of time 
toward the less probable state from the opposite direction (the former toward the 
past, the latter toward the future). By virtue of this terminology, such small 
isolated regions of the universe will always find themselves “initially” in an 
improbable state. This method seems to me to be the only way in which one 
can understand the second law —the heat death of each single world— 
without a unidirectional change of the entire universe from a definite initial 
state to a final state. 
(Boltzmann 1964, pp. 446-447; my italics) 
 
Since the forward and backward time orders are not just inequivocally 
distinguished by an apposite conventional terminology but are also experienced (in 
German one would say erlebt) as unmistakably different, Boltzmann is telling us 
here that it is downright impossible for someone not just to describe but also to 
observe an actual decrease of entropy (or a corresponding increase of H). Should it 
ever happen that we are actually involved in such a process, so that, say, the 
entropy of our surroundings was smaller yesterday than the day before yesterday, 
we would perceive yesterday as being tomorrow, and the day before yesterday as 
being the day after tomorrow. This mind-boggling idea came up about the same 
time as the hypothesis put forward by Lorentz and FitzGerald to explain 
Michelson’s failure to detect the relative motion of the Earth and the ether (§2). 
We have here two cases in which first-rate scientists sought to overcome a flagrant 
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conflict between theory and experience by attributing to nature some kind of 
systematic elusiveness. But surely Boltzmann went a long step farther than his 
colleagues. The Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction hypothesis only extended the scope 
of known forces, ascribing to them a new, hitherto unsuspected effect, which 
should be anyway open to ordinary experimental control. But Boltzmann 
postulated a radical change of language and indeed of consciousness to ensure that 
the phenomena of entropy decrease, which turned out to be neither impossible nor 
unlikely according to his statistical reasoning, remained unobserved forever.  
Yet Boltzmann did not surrender his good sense to this fancy. In his reply to 
Zermelo (1896b), which contains a passage that the last quotation repeats almost 
verbatim, this is preceded by a warning “against placing too much confidence in the 
extension of our thought pictures beyond the domain of experience”. Nevertheless, 
he adds, “with all these reservations, it is still possible for those who wish to give in to 
their natural impulses to make up a special picture of the universe”. He proposes 
two such pictures: either (?) “the entire universe finds itself at present in a very 
improbable state” or (?) it “is in thermal equilibrium as a whole and therefore dead” 
except in “relatively small regions of the size of our galaxy (which we call worlds) 
which, during the relatively short time of eons, deviate significantly from thermal 
equilibrium” (Boltzmann 1897, in Brush 2003, p. 416). He does admit, however, 
that “whether one wishes to indulge in such speculations is of course a matter of 
taste” (ibid., p. 417). 
It is told that when Loschmidt, who was Boltzmann’s colleague in Vienna, first 
told him that his gas would return from equilibrium to its initial non-equilibrium 
states if all molecular velocities are reversed, Boltzmann replied to him: “Well, you 
try to reverse them!” Brush (1976, p. 605), from whom I have the story, has good 
reasons to think it is apocryphal. But it does drive home the gist of Boltzmann’s 
statistical approach to time asymmetric thermal phenomena. Since non-equilibrium 
states are inordinately improbable, it is extremely difficult to pick out in the 
shoreless ocean of equilibrium states the pitifully small subsets from which non-
equilibrium states would be reached within a sensible length of time. Therefore, 
although according to the laws of mechanics it is perfectly possible for Boltzmann’s 
function H to increase above Hmin in a thermally isolated gas in equilibrium, for all 
practical purposes it is impossible to prepare an experiment in which this will 
happen. In several passages, Boltzmann fondly hints at this fact, with some 
rhetorical flourish. Yet this very fact raises a big question for him, namely: Why, if 
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states in which H > Hmin are so enormously improbable, is it fairly easy to pinpoint 
physical systems that are actually in such states and to isolate them so that they 
evolve in a fairly short time to an equilibrium state in which H = Hmin? 
The currently fashionable reply to this question has been chiefly promoted by 
the great Oxford mathematician Roger Penrose (1979; 1989, ch. 7; 2005, ch. 
27).97 It runs as follows. In the light of astronomical evidence, the universe can be 
represented to a good approximation (in the large) by an expanding Friedmann-
Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) model and this entails that, for some as yet 
unknown reason or no reason at all, when expansion began some 13,000,000,000 
years ago the state of the universe as a whole was an extremely improbable one, that 
is, a state of extremely low Boltzmann entropy. Since then the entropy of the 
universe has steadily increased, but it still has a very long way to go before reaching 
the maximally probable state of thermal death, from which the universe can then 
only move away through short-lived local fluctuations. Thus, one of the two pictures 
of the world which according to Boltzmann (1897) are available to people who 
wish to give in to their “natural” metaphysical impulses, namely, the one labelled 
(?) above, can be assigned a definite content allegedly supported by scientific 
cosmology. I was greatly confused when I first read Penrose’s proposal, for I admired 
his work on General Relativity (Penrose 1965, 1968; Hawking and Penrose 1970) 
and trusted his judgment on GR matters, but, on the other hand, I was well aware 
of the stringent condition of homogeneity satisfied by FLRW models. Only if the 
distribution of energy on each hypersurface of simultaneity is absolutely uniform, do 
the Einstein field equations admit a Friedmann-Lemaître solution. I took this to 
mean that FLRW models arise and remain in a state of thermal equilibrium. Indeed, 
in the peculiar hybrid of GR gravitational theory with non-GR particle physics 
known as Big Bang cosmology, “the matter (including radiation) in the early stages 
appears to have been completely thermalized (at least so far as this is possible, 
compatibly with the expansion)”, for “if it had not been so, one would not get 
correct answers for the helium abundance” (Penrose 1979, p. 611). Indeed, the 
perfect thermal equilibrium between parts of the Big Bang universe which lie 
outside each other’s horizon and therefore have never had an opportunity of 
interacting among themselves was initially one of the motivations of inflationary 
                                            
97  Penrose’s idea is unquestioningly accepted by both Price and Callender, the two 
parties to the debate on “the origin of time’s arrow” in Hitchcock (2004). 
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cosmology.98 Of course, the universe is not in a state of thermal equilibrium and can 
be regarded as an expanding FLRW universe only through substantial simplification 
and idealization. Nevertheless, Penrose’s claim that the world began in a state of 
very low entropy, based on a simplified and idealized world model that presupposes 
perfect uniformity, seemed to me baffling (to say the least). 
Penrose argues that in Big Bang cosmology the early universe is in a very low 
entropy state due to the somewhat anomalous behavior of gravity with regard to 
entropy:99 
In many cases in which gravity is involved, a system may behave as though it 
has a negative specific heat.100 […] This is essentially an effect of the universally 
attractive nature of the gravitational interaction. As a gravitating system 
'relaxes' more and more, velocities increase and the sources clump together – 
instead of uniformly spreading throughout space in a more familiar high-
entropy arrangement. With other types of force, their attractive aspects tend 
to saturate (such as with a system bound electromagnetically), but this is not 
the case with gravity. Only non-gravitational forces can prevent parts of a 
gravitationally bound system from collapsing further inwards as the system 
relaxes. Kinetic energy itself can halt collapse only temporarily. In the 
absence of significant non-gravitational forces, when dissipative effects come 
further into play, clumping becomes more and more marked as the entropy 
increases. Finally, maximum entropy is achieved with collapse to a black 
hole. 
(Penrose 1979, p. 612; my italics). 
 
If gravity is naturally attractive and gravitational sources tend to clump together, the 
thoroughly uniform, clump-free universe assumed by relativistic cosmology 
(Einstein 1917; Friedmann 1922, 1924) may well be said to be in a very 
                                            
98  This is nicely explained by Guth (1997), pp. 180-186. 
99  At first sight the appeal to gravity is perplexing, for, as I pointed out in footnote 83, 
thermodynamics cannot be rigorously applied to a material system exposed to 
powerful gravitational action. But surely Penrose is not talking here about 
thermodynamic entropy, but about “some analytic quantity, usually involving 
expressions such as –p ln p, that appears in information theory, probability theory and 
statistical mechanical models” (Lieb and Yngvason 1998, p. 571). 
100  Penrose cites the case of black holes, which get hotter as they emit Hawking radiation, 
and of satellites in orbit around the earth, which speed up, rather than slowing down, 
due to frictional effects in the atmosphere. 
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improbable state (not just initially, though, but throughout its entire history). Now, 
attraction was always the distinguishing character of gravity, e.g. in Aristotelian 
physics, and under Newton’s dispensation attraction became universal. But 
Friedmann showed, to Einstein’s initial dismay, that the gravitational interaction 
governed by the GR field equations can be either attractive or repulsive (even if the 
cosmological constant ? = 0), depending on parameters of the model. Thanks to 
Friedmann’s mathematical discovery one could contemplate a viable scientific 
cosmology, which then came to fruition thanks to the physical discoveries of Hubble 
and of Penzias and Wilson. But neither the mathematics of GR nor all the splendid 
data of modern telescopy and radio-telescopy assign a probability to the initial state 
of an expanding FLRW universe (as compared, say, with the single-clump universe 
predicted by some forms of Newtonian cosmology). We encounter here the 
difficulty I already mentioned in footnote 96. The world teems with events, 
processes and situations to which the concept of probability and statististical 
reasoning are fruitfully applied; but to estimate the probability of the universe as 
whole involves, I dare say, a category mistake. Even if I am wrong, to set up the 
required terms of comparison —to define the probability space in which the initial 
state of our present universe is a point (or would it take up a region?)— clearly 
demands a much greater exertion of the human fancy than it is reasonable to allow 
in science. For a thorough demystification of the low entropy Big Bang I refer the 
reader to Earman (2006), a perspicuous and compelling example of powerful HPS 
criticism. Its timely publication allows me to put here an end to our trek.101 
                                            
101  A fuller discussion of time-asymmetry in statistical mechanics would have to deal with 
work done in the wake of Krylov’s scathing criticism of the traditional foundations of 
statistical mechanics (Krylov 1979). A good review with abundant references will be 
found in Uffink (2006), §6. From my amateurish philosophical standpoint, I feel 
attracted by Mackey (1992), who studies the conditions for entropy increase to a 
maximum in closed thermodynamic systems and concludes that this is possible only 
under the special condition called mixing, and that it is necessary only under the more 
special condition of exactness, which can never hold in an invertible dynamical system 
such as those governed by Hamilton’s equations. But I do not presume to pass 
judgment over these mathematical results. However, I was glad to note that the very 
notions of invertibility and non-invertibility —as defined by Mackey (1992, pp. 23f.) for 
Markov operators— presuppose the choice of a preferred direction of time. 
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In this §4 I have dwelt at considerable length on a matter which, to an even 
greater degree than those I dealt with in §§ 1-3, may be said to be a philosophical 
question raised by physics rather than a problem in physics. I think it is clear that 
the treatment of this matter can advance through conceptual criticism, perhaps 
only through it. However, it does not appear that there are any narrowly scientific 
problems whose solution has been delayed by befuddled notions regarding time’s 
arrow (except insofar as its discussion has absorbed mental efforts that might have 
been invested in such problems). Obviously, my choice of examples owes much to 
my professional bias. It would be interesting to see if a physicist can come up with a 
difficulty in physics proper which has been solved or which one may expect to solve 
by dissecting concepts.102 Unless such examples are forthcoming, we should 
conclude that HPS work, which Hasok Chang has aptly described as the 
continuation of science by other means, effectively continues it for other ends than 
those that working scientists usually have in mind while they get on with their daily 
chores. 
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102  It is clear to me that some of Einstein’s most decisive contributions fall squarely under 
this description and so do some of Newton’s, and Galileo’s. In our era of specialism, 
should it be the job of HPS to carry on with this kind of work? 
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